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Speaking up about or confronting everyday prejudice creates more positive attitudes 
towards groups in the short-term. However, the mechanism underlying confrontation’s 
prejudice reducing effect remains unclear. Because one goal of confronting prejudice is 
attitude change, a persuasion framework provides a theoretical model for research. Based 
on an integration of the confronting prejudice and persuasion literatures, I developed and 
tested three hypotheses about the effects of confrontation and elaboration of 
confrontation messages on observers’ attitudes and behavior in the short- and longer-
term. I expected that observing a confrontation (vs. no confrontation) reduces prejudice 
and discrimination; that elaborating on confrontation messages reduces prejudice and 
discrimination more than confrontation alone; and that elaborating on confrontation 
messages causes attitude change that lasts longer than confrontation alone. To test these 
hypotheses, participants were recruited to complete measures of sexism and feelings 
toward subtypes of women across three time points (i.e., pre-test, lab manipulation, and 
post-test). During the lab manipulation, participants imagined observing sexist jokes that 
were either confronted or not confronted. In addition, participants in confrontation 
conditions then wrote a control essay or an essay elaborating on the confrontation. Across 
these manipulations, there were three conditions to which 361 participants were randomly 
 assigned: no confrontation control, confrontation-only, or confrontation+elaboration. 1-
14 days after the lab manipulation, 161 participants completed the post-test, which 
included a measure of discrimination, ostensibly as part of an unrelated study. Results 
indicated that observing a confrontation (vs. no confrontation) resulted in more positive 
feelings toward women and less discrimination in the short- and longer-term, but there 
was no significant reduction in sexism. Contrary to predictions, elaboration of 
confrontation messages did not reduce prejudice or discrimination more than 
confrontation alone. In addition, elaborated confrontation did not cause attitude change to 
last longer over time. Overall, this study suggests that confronting prejudice reduces 
prejudice and discrimination in observers in the longer-term but that this effect is not 
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Prejudice Reduction  
Prejudice is a concept that has captured the attention of social scientists for 
decades (Paluck & Green, 2009). Bias and negative attitudes toward social groups (i.e., 
prejudice) have been the subjects of definitional debates and theorizing, and studies 
focused on these topics have developed new methodologies in psychology. Most research 
on prejudice has focused on the nature, measurement, causes, and consequences of 
prejudice (Oskamp, 2000). For example, contemporary theories have conceptualized 
prejudice as more covert, subtle, and ambivalent (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Glick 
& Fiske, 2001) than older theories of blatant prejudice (Monteith & Mark, 2009). Given 
the decrease in explicitly endorsed prejudice, social psychologists developed new 
measures of implicit bias, such as the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998). Research on causes of prejudice has examined how individual 
differences, such as those related to personality (e.g., authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation; Sidanius & Pratto 1999) and motivation (e.g., internal and 
external regulation; Plant & Devine, 1998), relate to prejudice. Finally, the consequences 
of prejudice have been examined for both targets (e.g., anger and depression; Swim, 
Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001) and observers (e.g., stereotyping and discrimination; 
Ford, Boxer, Armstrong, & Edel, 2008). However, the literature on prejudice has yet to 
successfully address the more practical question of how to reduce prejudice in real world 
settings and society more broadly. 
Nearly 1,000 studies that have examined prejudice reduction, and most of these 
studies are either laboratory research lacking external validity or field research lacking 
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internal validity (Paluck & Green, 2009). As such, still more research is needed to 
understand the processes that reduce prejudice. Existing approaches to prejudice 
reduction can be divided into five categories, which range from individual- to group-level 
interventions: self-regulation, social categorization and identity, intergroup contact, 
education/training, and social norms and persuasion. Each is reviewed in order to provide 
background for the present study on prejudice reduction through confronting prejudice. 
Self Regulation 
Prejudice has an affective component (e.g., negative feelings toward groups), a 
behavioral component (e.g., discrimination), and a cognitive component (e.g., 
stereotypes). Unfortunately, cultural stereotypes (i.e., beliefs about an individual’s 
characteristics based on group membership) can be automatically activated in the 
presence of cues – even among low-prejudice people who do not endorse stereotypes 
(Devine, 1989). This finding is a problem for the reduction of prejudice because activated 
stereotypes cause discriminatory behavior (e.g., Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985). In 
order to reduce prejudice and its components, people have to be aware of the potential for 
bias and then control that bias.  
One way to control bias is through stereotype suppression, in which people avoid 
thinking about cultural stereotypes. However, thought suppression often has the 
paradoxical effect of making that thought more accessible (Wegner, 1994). The 
underlying process is two-fold—people search their minds for the presence of the 
unwanted thought and, if it is present, replace the stereotype with a distractor thought. 
Ironically, this increased awareness and monitoring of thoughts makes the thought more 
accessible. Applied to stereotyping, the process of monitoring for stereotypes decreases 
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stereotyping on an immediate task but increases stereotyping on later tasks, which has 
been called stereotype rebound (e.g., Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994). 
Stereotype rebound occurs when the admonishment to avoid stereotypes has been 
relaxed, but the stereotype remains primed, accessible, and memorable (Macrae, 
Bodenhausen, Milne, & Wheeler, 1996) because of the previous monitoring process. The 
result is that the stereotype “floods” the mind and influences later behavior.  
The tendency for stereotype rebound means that controlling prejudice through 
stereotype suppression does not reduce prejudice and discrimination in the long-term; 
however, people differ in their susceptibility to stereotype rebound. Research has 
replicated the stereotype rebound conditions while examining whether participants’ level 
of prejudice moderated the effect. People who have less (vs. more) prejudice should be 
particularly motivated to avoid bias because of their personal commitment to avoiding 
bias. Consistent with this notion, high-prejudice participants showed increased stereotype 
accessibility after stereotype suppression but low-prejudice participants did not 
(Monteith, Spicer, & Tooman, 1998). In fact, additional research suggests that people can 
control prejudice given the motivation and ability to do so.  
Self-regulation is a construct that involves setting goals and working towards 
them. An approach to individual prejudice reduction that is consistent with this construct 
would involve setting and working toward an egalitarian goal, which differs from 
stereotype suppression. Stereotype suppression involves the avoidance of non-egalitarian 
thoughts/behavior, whereas self-regulation involves the approach of egalitarian 
thoughts/behavior. Still, both processes require motivation and ability. Although people 
are susceptible to automatic activation of stereotypes regardless of their personal 
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prejudice level, low-prejudice people have more motivation to avoid prejudice and 
respond in egalitarian ways than high-prejudice people do (e.g., Devine, 1989). However, 
high-prejudice people might also be motivated to avoid appearing prejudiced if they are 
high in external motivation to control prejudice (i.e., respond to social pressure to avoid 
prejudice; Plant & Devine, 1998).  
In some ways, self-regulation of prejudice is similar to Festinger’s cognitive 
dissonance theory (1957). Cognitive dissonance occurs when one recognizes a 
discrepancy between an attitude and behavior, which causes discomfort. As a result, the 
individual changes either the attitude or behavior in order to gain consistency between 
attitude and behavior. Similarly, when a low-prejudice person recognizes discriminatory 
behavior that is in conflict with his/her egalitarian attitudes, it causes discomfort. 
Discomfort then causes the person to change later behavior to be consistent with his/her 
egalitarian attitudes, thus self-regulating prejudice.  
Similarly, Monteith and Mark (2005) suggest that self-regulation of prejudice 
begins when an individual becomes aware of the discrepancy between a prejudiced 
response (e.g., the use of an automatically activated stereotype) and one’s personal 
egalitarian standards. This discrepancy causes behavioral inhibition (e.g., interruption of 
the response), negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilt), and reflection on the factors 
leading to the discrepant response, which leads to the development of cues for control of 
future behavior. Once an individual has identified cues related to their discrepant 
response, future situations in which those cues are present should cause behavioral 
inhibition as well as prospective reflection (e.g., careful consideration of response 
options) should occur in future situation in which those cues are present. These processes 
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then inhibit discrimination and generate non-prejudiced response options (Monteith & 
Mark, 2009). 
This Self-Regulation of Prejudice Model (Monteith & Mark, 2005) has received 
empirical support. For example, participants who reported greater discrepancies between 
how they would and should (i.e., based on personal standards) respond to prejudiced 
jokes experienced more negative self-directed (Monteith & Voils, 1998). Behavioral 
inhibition has also been demonstrated following discrepancies. For example, participants 
in one study were connected to physiological equipment, shown pictures, and asked to 
press a key to continue to the next picture. Participants then received bogus feedback that 
indicated they had a negative reaction to pictures of racial minorities. Consistent with the 
notion that awareness of prejudiced responses that are discrepant with one’s beliefs 
causes behavioral inhibition, participants given this feedback subsequently took longer to 
press the key to go to the next picture for pictures of minorities (Monteith, Ashburn-
Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002). Thought listing has been used to study whether prejudiced 
behavior-belief discrepancy also leads to retrospective reflection. Participants who 
believed they had negative or discriminatory responses to disadvantaged groups showed a 
preoccupation with their responses (e.g., listing more thoughts relevant to the racial 
minority pictures; Monteith et al., 2002; see also Monteith, 1993). Finally, there also is 
support for the notion that awareness of discrepancy and the resulting processes (i.e., 
behavioral inhibition, negative self-directed affect, and retrospective reflection) improves 
future self-regulation (i.e., through behavioral inhibition and prospective reflection). For 
example, participants who received bogus feedback indicating prejudice later took longer 
to evaluate prejudiced jokes and evaluated prejudiced jokes more negatively in an 
 6 
ostensibly unconnected study compared to participants not given this feedback (Monteith, 
1993; Study 2). 
However, the problem still remains that many people are not motivated or lack the 
ability to control prejudice. Self-regulatory processes are not likely to be effective for 
high-prejudice individuals because they lack the motivation to behave in egalitarian 
ways. Additionally, self-regulation requires the ability to avoid prejudiced responding, 
which can be limited in certain situations. For example, when people lack cognitive 
resources (i.e., under conditions of high cognitive load), even low-prejudice people are 
unable to regulate their prejudiced responses (Monteith & Voils, 1998). This limitation of 
the self-regulation approach to prejudice reduction suggests that other means of reducing 
prejudice are necessary. 
Intergroup Contact 
Intergroup contact or interaction between different social groups is another means 
through which prejudice reduction is achieved. However, Allport (1954) noted that 
intergroup contact might either increase or reduce prejudice. According to his contact 
hypothesis/theory, certain features of intergroup contact are necessary to reduce prejudice 
and conflict. Specifically, the contact situation must involve equal status, cooperation, 
common goals, and institutional and social support. For example, researchers in the 
classic Robbers Cave field study (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) 
constructed situations in which there was competition between young campers, which led 
to prejudice and hostility between the two camps. The researchers were able to reduce 
prejudice, however, through situations in which the camps worked cooperatively toward 
common goals. Further, the campers were of equal status, and there was institutional 
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support for the campers’ interactions. Thus, the Robbers Cave study illustrates each of 
the features of intergroup contact that may successfully reduces prejudice.  
In another compelling study that combines the benefits of laboratory and field 
research, White participants in the American South in the 1960s were hired to work on a 
railroad supervising a Black confederate and a White confederate (Cook, 1971, 1978). 
The working conditions over the month-long experiment had each of the features of 
intergroup contact that Allport (1954) specified. Consistent with the contact hypothesis, 
results showed that participants who had worked with a Black confederate were less 
prejudiced than control participants were several months later.  
Other research also has supported Allport’s (1954) features for successful 
intergroup contact. For example, the Jigsaw classroom technique has been well-studied 
and involves cooperative learning (Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, & Snapp, 1978; see 
also Slavin, 1990). Specifically, this teaching technique requires each student to be 
responsible for a subtopic. The student is then the subtopic expert and must share this 
information with their group to meet the learning objective. This technique involves 
equal status students (i.e., who each have a piece of information to share) working 
cooperatively toward a common goal with institutional support. As such, it is not 
surprising that cooperative learning techniques have been shown to reduce prejudice 
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000; Walker & Crogan, 1998) as well as increase cross-group 
friendships (i.e., across race, gender, and achievement; Singh, 1991). More broadly, a 
meta-analysis of 515 studies found that the intergroup contact reduces prejudice (mean r 
= -.22); however, intergroup contact reduces prejudice to a greater degree when the 
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features Allport (1954) specified were present (mean r  = -.29) than when they were 
absent (mean r = -.20; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).   
Contemporary research has added more features of intergroup contact that reduce 
prejudice, including potential for acquaintance and friendship (Pettigrew, 1997, 1998). 
For example, a longitudinal study of college students’ friendship showed that having 
more outgroup friends decreased prejudice years later (Levin, Van Laar, & Sidanius, 
2003). In fact, knowing that another ingroup member has an outgroup friend reduces 
prejudice toward that outgroup (i.e., extended contact hypothesis; Wright, Aron, 
McLaughlin-Volpe, & Rop, 1997; see also Turner, Hewstone, Voci, Paolini, & Christ, 
2007). Another longitudinal study of intergroup friendship indicated that contact reduces 
prejudice but also that prejudice reduces contact (Binder, Zagefka, Brown, Funke, 
Kessler, Mummendey, Muquil, et al., 2009). This study also supported Allport’s (1954) 
features of intergroup contact, because the quality of intergroup friendships influenced 
prejudice more than the quantity of intergroup friendships. Specifically, high quality 
friendships featuring equal status and cooperation were associated with less prejudice. 
Although evidence across experimental, field, and longitudinal studies indicates 
that intergroup contact reduces prejudice (e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), people avoid 
intergroup interactions if given the opportunity (Plant & Devine, 2003). Intergroup 
interactions cause anxiety and discomfort because people have negative expectations 
about the outcome of these interactions (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). An 
additional problem is that intergroup contact is not always possible or easily achieved 
(e.g., concealable stigma or lack of a member of a specific minority group in the area). 
Finally, intergroup contact cannot explain the continuation of sexism, because most 
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people have contact with both men and women. For these reasons and others, researchers 
have examined the processes underlying intergroup contact that cause prejudice 
reduction. 
Social Categorization and Identity 
People have a tendency to categorize others based on their group memberships. 
Ingroup members share a characteristic with an individual (i.e., leading one to share a 
social identity with ingroup members) whereas outgroup members differ on that 
characteristic. However. categorization exaggerates differences between in- and out-
groups as well as the similarity within the outgroup (i.e., outgroup homogeneity effect; 
Judd & Park, 1988; Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991). People also favor their ingroup and 
derogate the outgroup (e.g., Brewer & Brown, 1998). In fact, ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup derogation can be activated even for arbitrary, meaningless categories randomly 
assigned to participants in the lab (i.e., minimal groups paradigm; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Allport was the first to argue that the process underlying prejudice involved simple group 
categorization (1954), and contemporary research on prejudice reduction has examined 
ways to combat categorization in order to reduce prejudice.  
There are a variety of ways to change how people categorize themselves and 
others, and changes to categorization can reduce prejudice. The most commonly 
examined category-based approaches to reduce prejudice include decategorization, group 
differentiation, and recategorization (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). Decategorization 
decreases the salience of social categories by increasing the focus on individuals rather 
than groups. For example, the exchange of individuating information undermines 
outgroup stereotypes (Brewer & Miller, 1984), and personalized intergroup contact 
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focused on persons rather than tasks reduces prejudice (Miller, Brewer, & Edwards, 
1985).  
However, eliminating group boundaries can sometimes cause resistance and 
increased prejudice (Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010; Jetten, Spears, & 
Postmes, 2004). The Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model (Hewstone & Brown, 
1986) instead posits that prejudice could be reduced by maintaining group categorization 
in a cooperative, intergroup setting. Similar to multicultural approaches to intergroup 
relations, differences between groups are recognized and valued in group differentiation 
approaches to categorization. The goal is to have both groups recognize differences and 
how these differences might benefit both groups through collaborative work toward a 
common goal. This process of maintaining group distinctiveness while highlighting 
interdependence decreases intergroup threat as well as prejudice (e.g., Brown & Wade, 
1987; see also Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Consistent with the Mutual Intergroup 
Differentiation Model, meta-analysis indicates that intergroup contact has been shown to 
reduce prejudice through increased outgroup knowledge and reduced intergroup anxiety 
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). However, a longitudinal study examining whether intergroup 
anxiety mediates intergroup friendships and prejudice reduction found only partial 
mediation, which suggests that intergroup anxiety as well as other factors (e.g., empathy; 
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008) influence prejudice reduction (Binder et al., 2009). 
Recategorization differs from decategorization, (i.e., eliminating category 
boundaries) and mutual group differentiation (i.e., maintain category boundaries in a 
cooperative setting) because it creates a superordinate category or identity that overrides 
the distinctions between ingroups and outgroups. The Common Ingroup Identity Model 
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(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) posits that prejudice is reduced if ingroups and outgroups are 
recategorized into a larger, more inclusive group (e.g., recategorizing “Jewish” to 
“human” identity; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). This process harnesses the power of 
ingroup favoritism in order to reduce prejudice. The positive evaluations and feelings 
normally reserved for a narrowly defined ingroup can be applied to a broader, 
superordinate group that is inclusive of both groups. In other words, what was “us” and 
“them” becomes “we” through recategorization (Gaertner, Dovidio, & Houlette, 2010). 
Consistent with this model, common ingroup identity has been shown to reduce prejudice 
for majority members (Smith & Tyler, 1996) as well as students in a multiethnic high 
school (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1996) and executives in a 
corporate merger (Bachman, 1993). Similarly, students with dual identities including a 
superordinate category (e.g., Korean and American) had less prejudice than students with 
a single identity did (e.g., Korean; Gaertner et al., 1996). Given the success of these 
category- and identity-based approaches, they would be a welcome addition to education 
and training that seeks to reduce prejudice, which I turn to next. 
Education and Training 
Several educational approaches may reduce prejudice, including multicultural and 
anti-bias education, social-cognitive skills training, and perspective taking interventions. 
According to a survey of American school districts, nearly half use a multicultural 
education program (Washburn, 1996). Multicultural education in schools emphasizes 
tolerance and/or contributions of disadvantaged groups (Aboud & Levy, 2000). For 
example, reading about African American historical figures’ experiences and 
contributions reduced majority students’ prejudice (Hughes, Bigler, & Levy, 2007). 
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Multicultural programs featuring positive stories and media about minorities are not 
always successful (Lessing & Clarke, 1976; Litcher & Johnson, 1969; Litcher, Johnson & 
Ryan, 1973; Yawkey, 1973). However, longer interventions that involve reading about 
cross-group friendships followed by discussion seem to reduce prejudice more effectively 
than multicultural literature alone (Cameron & Rutland, 2006; Paluck & Green, 2009). 
Anti-bias education with older students and adults often involves discussion, 
which may be more effective than simple exposure to readings or media (Aboud & Levy, 
2000; Fisher, 1968; Slavin & Madden, 1979). Similar to research on self-regulation, anti-
bias education draws on self-insight. That is, it encourages students to recognize the 
potential for bias, which may lead to feelings of guilt and increased vigilance to control 
prejudice. Across several studies, anti-racism education has been shown to reduce 
prejudice in students (McGregor, 1993), but it can backfire and increase prejudice in 
adults (Kehoe & Mansfield, 1993). Diversity training is the umbrella term for 
educational, anti-bias programs and/or activities that are conducted in the workplace. 
Although most American employers use diversity training, most diversity training is not 
informed by social science theories or research and has not been evaluated using social 
science methods (Paluck, 2006). 
Other interventions to reduce prejudice focus on social-cognitive skills, with the 
goal of changing schemas and categorization processes that underlie prejudice. For 
example, some interventions combat outgroup homogeneity by having students learn 
individuating information about fictional students from outgroups (e.g., Katz & Zalk, 
1978), which reduced prejudice amongst formerly high-prejudice students (Aboud & 
Fenwick, 1999). Similarly, interventions that highlight the malleability of personality also 
 13 
reduce outgroup homogeneity and stereotyping (e.g., Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy, 
Strosessner, & Dweck, 1998). Finally, a week-long intervention featuring a task in which 
students practiced thinking in counter-stereotypic ways by classifying pictures according 
to gender and occupation reduced stereotyping (Bigler & Liben, 1992, 1993). 
Perspective taking interventions that increase outgroup empathy can also reduce 
prejudice. These interventions typically involve role-playing to gain understanding of 
minority experiences, which encourages empathy and reduces prejudice toward the 
outgroup. The most well known example of a perspective taking intervention is the Blue-
Eyes/Brown-Eyes exercise, which was devised by a third-grade teacher named Jane Elliot 
in the 1960s. Elliot assigned students to two groups based on eye color and showed 
preferential treatment to one group on the first day and the other group on the second day. 
Thus, all students temporarily were members of a devalued group. Variations of this 
exercise have been examined in the laboratory and field, and results indicate that it 
increases intentions for outgroup interactions (Weiner & Wright, 1973; Breckheimer & 
Nelson, 1976).  
Even less-intensive perspective taking interventions can reduce prejudice, 
however. For example, participants asked to take the point of view of the stigmatized 
person by imagining the person’s feelings (vs. taking an objective point of view) had less 
prejudice toward the stigmatized group (Batson, Polycarpou, Harmon-Jones, Imhoff, 
Mitchener, & Bednar, 1997). Similarly, participants who wrote an essay from the 
perspective of a disadvantaged group member showed greater empathy and decreased 
steretotyping and prejudice (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 
2003; see also Stephan & Finlay, 1999). However, perspective taking can interrupt 
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intergroup interactions, leading to more negative evaluations of majority group members 
by minority group members after an interaction (Vorauer, Martens, & Sasaki, 2009). 
Next, I turn to more broad interventions that may reduce prejudice. 
Social Norms and Influence 
Finally, social norms can be communicated and reduce prejudice through a 
variety of mediums (e.g., media and peer influence). Media includes readings, 
advertisements, television, and movies, and each can convey and influence social norms. 
For example, Sesame Street and other high quality, multicultural children’s programming 
increases tolerance in children (Browne Graves, 1999; Mays, Henderson, Seidman, & 
Steiner, 1975). However, social scientists have rarely examined media’s large-scale 
impact over time or audiences. (For a review, see Paluck & Green, 2009.) 
One exception is a randomized field experiment that examined beliefs, behavior, 
and perceived norms one year after the introduction of an educational Rwandan radio 
soap opera (Paluck, 2009). The radio program featured two communities’ struggle with 
conflict, and it was designed to facilitate reconciliation between the Tutsi and Hutu 
peoples following the Rwandan genocide in the 1990s. Although personal beliefs were 
not affected, perceived norms and behavior became more egalitarian for participants who 
listened to the reconciliation broadcast compared to a control broadcast. As Paluck 
argues, it may be that educational media has a larger influence on perceived norms than 
beliefs; still, perceived norms affect behavior. In this case, an educational campaign 
created more egalitarian behavior by changing perceived norms. 
Friends, peers, and others in our social world can also influence the expression of 
and belief in prejudice. For example, participants who are told that stereotyping is rare 
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among their peers (vs. control participants) have less prejudice (Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 
2001). Witnessing a peer give a low prejudice response also reduces prejudice—most 
likely by establishing an egalitarian norm (Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughan, 
1994; Blanchard, Lilly, & Vaughn, 1991; Monteith, Deneen, & Tooman, 1996). Finally, 
friends and acquaintances of students trained to speak out against instances of everyday 
prejudice (vs. wait list controls) engaged in more anti-prejudice behavior (Paluck, 2011). 
Implications and Conclusion 
Clearly, this review suggests that there is no antidote for prejudice. Each approach 
to reducing prejudice has advantages and disadvantages. As such, a multi-pronged 
approach involving a variety of the five approaches is likely to be most effective at 
reducing prejudice. However, research on prejudice reduction through social influence 
highlights that there are simple things that everyone can do to reduce prejudice in society.  
As indicated in the literature review that follows, speaking up about everyday 
prejudice (i.e., confronting prejudice) can reduce prejudice. Although the mechanisms 
behind this effect are not well understood, there are a variety of ways that confronting 
prejudice might involve the broader processes of prejudice reduction. Confronting 
prejudice might trigger self-regulation of prejudice, for example. Confronting prejudice 
brings awareness to prejudice, which may encourage behavioral inhibition, negative self-
directed affect, and reflection. According to the Self-Regulation of Prejudice Model 
(Monteith & Mark, 2005), these processes serve to develop cues for control to avoid 
future prejudiced behavior.  
Confronting prejudice might also be related to research on the effects of 
intergroup contact. Research on the contact hypothesis has highlighted the importance of 
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high quality interactions. The features of contact that Allport (1954) specified as related 
to prejudice reduction might also influence the outcomes of confronting prejudice. For 
example, confrontation that occurs between people of equal status might reduce prejudice 
more than confrontations within hierarchical relationships. Further, perhaps confrontation 
messages highlighting cooperation, common goals, and institutional and social support 
may increase confrontation’s ability to reduce prejudice. 
Similarly, confronting prejudice may be related to research on social 
categorization interventions through the appeals that confronters present to perpetrators. 
For example, a confronter might attempt to reduce prejudice by arguing that individuals 
vary more than groups (i.e., a decategorization message), that differences between groups 
are mutually beneficial (i.e., a group differentiation message based on the Mutual 
Intergroup Differentiation Model; Brown & Hewstone, 2005), or that there is a 
superordinate category inclusive of both in- and outgroups (i.e., a recateogrization 
message based on the Common Ingroup Identity Model; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). 
Thus, confronting prejudice builds on many of the broader approaches taken to reduce 
prejudice, and understanding the effect of confronting prejudice may bolster 




Literature Review on Confronting Prejudice 
 Prejudiced statements are frequent and have negative effects on both targets and 
observers. For example, sexist interpersonal encounters (e.g., gender stereotyping, 
derogatory comments, and sexual objectification) occur as much as once a day (Swim et 
al., 2001). These experiences have cumulative negative effects for targets, including 
anger, depression, and decreased self-esteem, even when targets are uncertain whether 
prejudice motivated the event (Swim et al.). For observers, hearing prejudiced statements 
or derogatory labels activates stereotypical associations (Carnaghi & Maass, 2007) that 
are likely to influence attitudes and behavior (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Wheeler & 
Petty, 2001). Hearing a racial slur, for example, negatively influenced participant 
evaluations of an ethnic minority’s skill (Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985). Similarly, 
humor in which a group is characterized negatively serves as a releaser for prejudice. A 
study examining these issues showed that being exposed to a sexist joke led men who 
were high on hostile sexism to discriminate against women (Ford et al., 2008). Research 
in a burgeoning area in psychology, confronting prejudice, may provide ways to counter 
the negative effects of prejudice experienced by both targets and observers. 
Confronting prejudice has been defined in past research as individuals’ assertive 
responses to bias, which involves letting their distaste for the bias be known to others 
(Shelton, Richardson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2006). Specifically, the confrontation must 
involve an objection to the bias in the perpetrator’s original message. According to 
interviews and dairy data of women who confronted a variety of prejudices, the most 
common goal when people confront prejudice is educating the perpetrator in an effort to 
 18 
reduce the perpetrator’s prejudice (Hyers, 2007). Participants described other motivations 
for confronting prejudice besides perpetrator attitude or behavior change, including self-
validation (e.g., improved mental health or victim empowerment; Chin, Czopp, & Hovey, 
2009; Shelton et al.) and impression management. However, the present research focuses 
on the most common goal of confronting, which is attitude, behavior, and/or norm change 
leading to prejudice reduction.  
Research on confronting prejudice has mostly lacked a theoretical basis and has 
instead examined various factors concerning the perpetrator’s prejudiced message and the 
confronter’s message. This research has examined two different aspects of confrontation: 
the causes of confronting prejudice (i.e., When does confronting occur?) and the 
outcomes of confronting prejudice (i.e., What is the effect of confronting?). As shown in 
Figure 1, the causes and outcomes of confronting prejudice can be seen as separate 
processes that are influenced by different variables, which I discuss in turn. Although a 
recent theoretical model has been applied to when people confront prejudice (Ashburn-
Nardo, Morris, & Goodwin, 2008), no model has been proposed to explain the conditions 
relating to the outcomes of confronting prejudice.  
In the present review, I integrate the recent work on confronting prejudice into 
existing social psychological theory. The focus of the review is the variables that 
influence the outcomes of confronting prejudice on perpetrators as well as observers. The 
effect of confrontation on perpetrators has been the focus of most confrontation research 
(Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Czopp, Moneith, & Mark, 2006); however, observers are also 
influenced by confrontations (e.g., Hillard & Ryan, 2011; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). 
When asked to recall incidents of prejudice, nearly 82% of participants recalled a 
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situation in which they were observers of prejudice (i.e., third-party bystanders; Ashburn-
Nardo, Goodwin, & Morris, 2009), which presents an opportunity for confrontation to 
influence observers. Fennimore (1994) claims that “Hearing a person make a prejudiced 
comment is one common experience that provides everyone with an opportunity to 
express commitment to human equality and thus have an immediate positive effect on 
social perceptions and behaviors” (pp. 202). However, the effect of confrontation on 
observers is not fully understood. In my review of the literature on confronting prejudice, 
I argue that a persuasion framework is useful for examining the outcomes of confronting 
prejudice, because it accounts for both low and high effort processes leading to attitude 
change in perpetrators as well as observers. First, however, I begin by presenting research 
and models on the causes of confronting prejudice.  
Causes of Confronting Prejudice 
 The research that examines the causes of confrontation can be organized into the 
individual factors, situational factors, and barriers that influence whether confrontation 
occurs, as shown in Figure 2. In terms of personal factors, research has shown that those 
with activist goals or orientations are more likely to confront prejudice (e.g., Hyers, 2007; 
Swim & Hyers, 1999). For example, those who identify as feminists (Ayers, Friedman, & 
Leaper, 2009) or have a personal commitment to ending gender discrimination (Pratt-
Hyatt, 2008) are more likely to confront sexism. People who are more communally 
oriented (vs. exchange oriented) are also more likely to confront prejudice (Gervais, 
Hillard, & Vescio, 2010). People who expect confrontation to be successful (e.g., reduce 
prejudice) are more likely to confront prejudice (Hillard, 2011; Hyers, 2007). For 
example, confrontation is more likely when people believe that personality is malleable 
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(i.e., that others can change) rather than fixed (Rattan & Dweck, 2010). Similarly, 
optimists generally expect positive outcomes and thus are more likely to confront 
prejudice than pessimists are (Sechrist, 2010; Wellman, Czopp, & Geers, 2009).   
 Another individual factor is prior experience with confronting prejudice. Multiple 
studies have examined ways to increase confronting responses from children and adults, 
including skills training and role-play. Several studies aimed to increasing students’ 
confrontations concerning prejudice and bullying through interventions (e.g., Aboud & 
Joong, 2007; Lamb, Bigler, Liben & Green, 2009; Paluck, 2011). For example, students 
who received training and practiced confronting prejudice through role-play were more 
likely than wait-list students to later be nominated by peers as someone who confronts 
prejudice. Another study showed that having experience (vs. hearing stories about) 
confronting prejudice increases confronting in the short-term and six months later (Lamb 
et al., 2009). Other evidence indicates that adults also are more likely to confront 
prejudice if they have practiced doing so (e.g., Lawson, McDonough, & Bodle, 2010; 
Plous, 2000). 
In terms of situational factors, women’s likelihood of confronting depended on 
the type of sexism and relationships with the perpetrator (Ayers et al., 2009). Women 
were more likely to confront sexism when it involved sexist comments rather than 
discriminatory behavior or sexual harassment. Women were also more likely to confront 
familiar, equal status perpetrators than unfamiliar and/or high status perpetrators. A 
broader situational factor is the context or audience present for a confrontation. Targets 
who have solo or “token” status in the group are more likely to confront prejudice (vs. 
having other targets present; Swim & Hyers, 1999). In fact, majority members often look 
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to a minority target in response to offensive statements (Crosby, Monin, & Richardson, 
2008). 
There are several existing theoretical models or theories that are applicable to 
confronting prejudice. Two of these models come from literature on sexual harassment. 
Reporting sexual harassment and confronting prejudice are similar in that both are 
behaviors a complainant (i.e., the person who reports sexual harassment or the 
confronter) might engage in following unequal treatment. Knapp, Ekeberg, and Dubois’s 
(1997) model for responses to workplace sexual harassment includes antecedents 
(individual characteristics, power, legal/economic environment, work group 
characteristics, and organizational characteristics) relating to predictor variables 
(reporting process, outcome expectancy, severity of sexual harassment, and level of 
distress), which finally relate to whether sexual harassment is reported by the victim. 
Although some aspects of the model are specific to reporting sexual harassment (e.g., 
reporting process), other aspects are similar to what the participants report across studies 
of individual and situational factors that influence prejudice (see also Hillard, 2011).  
Bystander intervention models have been applied to both reporting sexual 
harassment (Bowes-Sperry & O’Leary-Kelly, 2005) and confronting prejudice. 
According to the Confronting Prejudiced Responses Model (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2008), 
there are five loose steps involved in confronting prejudice, based on Latane and Darley’s 
(1970) work on bystander intervention. Ashburn-Nardo et al. specify that steps in the 
process may be skipped, which is more likely when anger is involved. They suggest that 
their model can be taken as identifying common hurdles in confronting prejudice, when 
the decision to confront prejudice is made in a systematic manner. The model indicates 
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that individuals confront prejudice if and when they determine that the event is 
discriminatory and an “emergency” (i.e., an unexpected, harmful event that requires 
immediate attention). Next, individuals confront prejudice if they take responsibility, 
identify a response, and take action (Ashburn-Nardo et al.).  
There are many challenges at each of these steps. The target of the prejudice 
likely influences whether an event is defined as discriminatory, which is the first step in 
the Confronting Prejudice Responses Model. For example, racism is more likely than 
other forms of bias to be seen as discriminatory because racism is considered widely 
unacceptable; however, bias based on gender or sexual orientation is more acceptable 
(Herek, 2007; Monteith & Mark, 2005). Norms concerning egalitarianism based on 
ethnicity are extremely strong, which leads people to be non-racist in situations where the 
bias would be obvious (e.g., aversive racism; Gaetner & Dovidio, 1986). However, it is 
often difficult for majority members to notice subtle, everyday forms of prejudice toward 
minorities (Sue et al., 2007).  
Even if subtle racism is noticed and defined as discrimination, the second step in 
the model is seeing it as an emergency that requires immediate attention. The challenge at 
this step is that people may not be as upset about prejudice as they expect to be. 
Specifically, although participants in a recent study expected to be upset by a racist 
statement or event, actually experiencing the event was not as emotionally disturbing as 
anticipated (Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, & Dovidio, 2009).  
Thus, people may not confront prejudice in part because they are not as upset by 
prejudice as they expect to be, which may prevent people from defining the event as 
discriminatory and an emergency. It is a troubling that racism, which is widely 
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unacceptable, is less upsetting than expected. If racism does not cause confronting, it is 
unlikely that more acceptable forms of prejudice (i.e., sexism and anti-gay prejudice) 
cause confrontation either. These findings suggest that even the first two steps in the 
model present strong barriers to confronting. 
Although the Confronting Prejudiced Responses Model is important to 
understanding why individuals confront, especially given negative consequences of 
confrontation for confronters (i.e., being disliked or seen as a complainer; Czopp et al., 
2006; Dodd, Guiliano, Boutell, & Moran, 2001; Kaiser & Miller, 2001), it has three 
limitations. First, it explains confrontation only when the confronter has made a 
thoughtful, deliberative decision to confront prejudice rather than a more automatic 
decision. However, to my knowledge, there is no research indicating whether 
deliberative, systematic processes are used. Second, if and when systematic processes are 
used, there is only mixed evidence to support the steps of the model. In one study, 
participants’ closed-ended responses, which were designed to asses steps of the model as 
factors, were interpreted to support the model; however, open-ended responses were not 
descriptive of the steps outlined in the model (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2009; see also 
Hillard, 2011).  
The third limitation of the Confronting Prejudiced Responses Model is that it does 
not address the conditions under which confrontations actually work. That is, this model 
says nothing about what makes confrontations effective in changing prejudiced attitudes 
in confrontation recipients (i.e., perpetrators or observers) in the event that confrontation 
does occur. Other research has examined the outcomes of confronting prejudice, but 
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questions remain. What are the outcomes of confronting prejudice, and what causes 
confrontation to be effective?  
Outcomes of Confronting Prejudice in a Persuasion Framework 
 Research that examines the outcomes of confronting prejudice (vs. the conditions 
under which it occurs) for perpetrators and observers can be organized into four 
categories, as shown in Figure 3. Research has examined the following short-term 
outcomes immediately after confrontations: affective reactions, attitude change, behavior 
change, and confronter evaluation.  
Affective Reactions 
The examination of affective reactions as an outcome following confronting 
prejudice originates from research on the self-regulation of bias (Devine, Monteith, 
Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1996; Monteith et al., 2002; Monteith & Mark, 
2005). In order for individuals to regulate their bias, they must be aware of the bias. For 
both internal motivations to control bias (i.e., self-identifying as non-prejudiced) and 
external motivations to control bias (i.e., conforming to egalitarian social norms to avoid 
disapproval from others; Plant & Devine, 1998), being aware of bias causes negative 
affect. Monteith and colleagues’ work has examined guilt and shame along with other 
self-directed emotions.  
Guilt may serve as a self-regulation cue to control automatic bias. That is, cultural 
associations—which are often negative and stereotypical—are automatically activated in 
the presence of relevant cues (Devine, 1989). This type of automatic bias is assessed 
using implicit measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 
1998), which measure attitudes indirectly by comparing reaction times rather than asking 
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participants to report their attitudes (i.e., explicit measures). Research has shown that 
people taking the IAT detect that stereotypes facilitate their responses (i.e., it is easier to 
associate White [Black] exemplars with pleasant [unpleasant] words); detecting their 
implicit bias then causes guilt (Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001). This guilt has 
then been shown to lead to self-regulation of bias. Specifically, experiencing guilt after 
completing a Black-White IAT led participants to more quickly associate stereotypically 
Black names with “like,” which is a measure of implicit liking (Montieth et al., 2002). 
Participants also showed inhibition of current behavior and engaged in self-reflection.  
Other research has examined guilt as a trigger for prosocial behavior (Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006). By combining these 
views of guilt as a trigger for self-regulation and pro-social behaviors, research has 
examined whether increased guilt following a transgression was associated with 
decreased approach (i.e., inhibition; Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007). All 
participants completed an electroencephalograph (EEG) task and were led to believe they 
had negative responses to Black faces. Participants then indicated their level of guilt and 
rated their interest in reading various articles based on article titles. The bogus feedback 
that participants received indicated negative responses to Black faces, which caused guilt. 
Participants who reported experiencing more guilt expressed greater interest in reading 
articles on prejudice reduction. Increased guilt was also related to interest in reparatory 
behavior and increased approach, paradoxically. However, the same was not true for 
other negative self-directed, social emotions such as shame. Although previous research 
conceptualized guilt as a construct by combining all negative self-directed emotions into 
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one construct, this research suggests that guilt and shame have different implications for 
future behavior. 
Furthermore, the evidence to support the idea that guilt and/or negative self-
directed affect is related to decreased prejudice is based largely on implicit measures of 
prejudice, such as increased implicit liking of Black names (Montieth et al., 2002) and 
more interest in reading articles about prejudice reduction, along with shifts in frontal 
lobe EEG activity (Amodio et al., 2007). There is not, to my knowledge, any research 
showing that guilt leads to a reduction in explicit prejudice or discrimination, especially 
not outside of the immediate measurement in a laboratory setting. In fact, negative self-
directed affect and attempts at self-regulation may not generally reduce prejudice 
(Monteith, 1996).  
Other Outcomes 
Other research has examined attitude and behavior change as an outcome of 
confrontation rather than affective reactions. The most common goal(s) of confronting is 
attitude, behavior, and/or norm change (Hyers, 2007), which makes attitude and behavior 
change especially important outcomes of confronting. In fact, the first study of 
confronting prejudice showed that it changes attitudes (Citron, Chein, & Harding, 1950; 
see also Marcuse, 1951). Other research has shown that attitudes are more positive after 
confrontation (vs. before) for both perpetrators (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006) and observers 
(Hillard & Ryan, 2011). Similarly, confronting prejudice can reduce stereotypic 
behaviors (Czopp et al.; Mallet & Wagner, 2011) and increase egalitarian behavior 
(Paluck, 2011; Wellman et al., 2009). Still, evidence is needed that attitude and behavior 
change resulting from confrontation lasts over time.  
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Another outcome of confronting is the evaluation of the confronter by others, and 
research has shown that confronters are sometimes evaluated negatively (Czopp et al., 
2006; Dodd et al., 2001; Kaiser & Miller, 2001). For example, negative evaluations of 
confronters are especially likely when the confrontation message is hostile (Czopp et al.; 
Gervais & Hillard, 2011) and when the confronter is a target (vs. non-target) group 
member (Gervais & Hillard; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). However, confronters can 
sometimes also be seen positively (e.g., Mallett & Wagner, 2011; Saunders & Senn, 
2009), which may depend on other variables such as the confrontation message (Swim, 
Gervais, Pearson, & Stangor, 2009) and context (Gervais & Hillard). Although the 
potential interpersonal costs may discourage people from confronting, confrontations 
may still be beneficial in terms of other outcomes of confronting. For example, 
confronting causes attitude and behavior change even if evaluations of confronters are 
negative (Czopp et al.).  
 But what existing theories might explain these outcomes of confronting? 
Persuasion theories provide a framework to examine each of the four categories of 
outcomes (i.e., affective reactions, attitude change, behavior change, and confronter 
evaluation), as shown in Figure 4. Next, I specify how persuasion variables relate to these 
confrontation outcomes and also note whether this outcome is for perpetrators or 
observers. 
Overview of Major Persuasion Theories 
Persuasion and attitude change are major topics in social psychology, and many 
theories and models have been posited to explain the conditions under which persuasion 
occurs. The message-learning approaches by the Yale Group (Hovland, Janis, & Kelly, 
 28 
1953; McGuire, 1985) provided a context for examining persuasion by placing it in a 
learning paradigm. According to this approach, the processes of persuasion are similar to 
learning and include attention, comprehension, yielding, and retention (Bettinghaus & 
Cody, 1994). That is, the message must have a person’s attention and comprehension 
before causing lasting attitude change. Aspects of the communication, including the 
source, message, recipient/audience, and context, affect these message-learning 
processes.  
These four categories of variables (i.e., source, message, recipient, and context) 
affect persuasion by influencing the learning of the persuasive message. Research in this 
area has shown, for example, that more credible and attractive sources are more 
influential (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Witkin, Goodenough, & Oltman, 
1979). Messages that do not clearly intend to persuade and messages that refute counter 
arguments (i.e., two-sided messages) are more persuasive (Petty & Wegener, 1998). 
Recipient variables focus on individual differences that influence the likelihood of 
persuasion, such as need for cognition, issue knowledge, and issue involvement (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In the case of confronting prejudice, the 
source is the confronter, the message is the confrontation message, and the recipient is the 
person who receives the confrontation (i.e., the perpetrator or observer). Context 
variables related to the setting include the channel (i.e., the message’s mode of 
presentation) and audience distraction (Petty & Wegener). While the message learning 
approach provides a useful framework to examine the variables related to confronting 
prejudice, its limitation is the assumption that learning a message is tantamount to 
changing one’s attitude. Research instead suggests that people’s states as well as 
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interpretations of and reactions to a message influence persuasion (e.g., Gorn, 1982; 
Roberts & Maccoby, 1973). 
Decades of research in persuasion produced contradictory findings until dual 
process theories were proposed to explain the inconsistencies. According to the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic-
Systematic Model (HSM; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), persuasion can occur through low or 
high effort processing. These models explain when persuasion may occur through 
superficial examination of message content (i.e., low effort processing) or deeper 
examination of the message content and issue-relevant information (i.e., high effort 
processing).  
ELM involves two routes to persuasion depending on the extent of elaboration, or 
scrutiny, given to the message. Elaboration exists on a continuum from low to high, and 
one’s ability and motivation determine the extent of elaboration (Petty & Wegener, 
1998). When elaboration likelihood is high (i.e., when one has the ability and 
motivation), the central route will be used, which involves more deep, effortful 
processing of message arguments. When elaboration likelihood is low (i.e., when one 
does not have the ability and motivation), the peripheral route will be used, which 
involves shallower and less effortful processing (e.g., attending only to the attractiveness 
of the speaker rather than the strength of arguments). Contrary to the message learning 
approach, the peripheral route of ELM implies that persuasion can occur without learning 
or even attending to a message, although attitude change brought about by peripheral 
processing is likely weaker than attitude change brought about by central processing. 
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Similarly, HSM features high effort (i.e., systematic) and low effort (i.e., 
heuristic) processing. Systematic processing is thought to occur when one has the ability 
for more effortful processing and requires a high level of confidence in the attitude. 
Heuristic processing occurs when ability is constrained and/or only low levels of 
confidence are necessary. Thus, HSM proposes a sufficiency threshold, where processing 
stops once the required level of confidence is achieved (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). HSM 
also specifies that low effort processing involves heuristics and draws upon research on 
the development and activation of heuristics (Eagly & Chaiken). 
Although ELM and HSM have different features (e.g., elaboration continuum for 
ELM vs. sufficiency threshold for HSM), both nevertheless can be used to explain the 
same findings. ELM is more descriptive and accounts for more variables, because ELM 
includes more low-effort processes than heuristics alone. On the other hand, HSM is 
more explanatory and accounts for fewer variables, because HSM limits low effort 
processing to the use of heuristics. Proponents of the contemporary versions of both ELM 
and HSM insist that the two processing methods can co-occur (Petty & Wegener, 1998; 
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), although HSM focuses on the combined effects of the two 
methods of processing while ELM focuses on the distinct consequences of the two 
methods of processing. Given that both models revolve around the amount of effort or 
elaboration in processing messages, the term high effort processing refers to both ELM’s 
central route to persuasion and HSM’s systematic processing. Low effort processing 
refers to both ELM’s peripheral route to persuasion and HSM’s heuristic processing.  
Now I turn to how high and low effort processes might be used to explain the 
effects or consequences of confronting prejudice for perpetrators and observers. The 
 31 
message-learning categories (i.e., source, message, recipient, and context) are used to 
organize the variables that influence the outcomes of confrontation. The research findings 
across these categories of persuasion variables are then discussed with a focus on effort 
used in processing the confrontation. The goal is to show how variables related to the 
source, message, recipient, and context influence the participants’ processing of a 
confrontation of prejudice from an ELM/HSM perspective.  
Source 
 Manipulations of the race or gender of the confrontation source (i.e., confronter) 
have been shown to influence the effectiveness of confronting racism or sexism. 
Participants who were asked to imagine observing a confrontation reported feeling less 
guilt if the confronter was also the target of that prejudice (i.e., Blacks and women) than 
when confronters were not targets (i.e., Whites and men; Czopp & Monteith, 2003; 
Rasinski & Czopp, 2010).  
This finding can be explained in terms of the confrontation observer’s perceptions 
of the self-interest (or lack thereof) that motivates the confrontation. Taking an 
unexpected position that violates self-interest increases persuasion (Petty, Fleming, 
Priester, & Feinstein, 2001). Recent confrontation research shows that participants who 
were observers of confrontation were more surprised when a man (vs. a woman) 
confronted sexism (Gervais & Hillard, 2011). In this case, target confronters (i.e., Blacks 
and women) may have been seen as acting in their self-interest, thus conforming to 
expectations. However, non-target confronters (i.e., Whites and men) may have been seen 
as acting without self-interest, which violates expectations and causes surprise and 
increased persuasion in confrontation recipients.  
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In a similar study (Czopp et al., 2006; Study 2), the ethnicity of the target was 
manipulated and affective reactions were measured as in Czopp and Monteith (2003), but 
the confrontation was in vivo rather than imagined. That is, participants were led to make 
a stereotypic association and then confronted about this association by a confederate. The 
results, however, conflicted with the earlier study, as the White confronter did not cause 
more guilt than the Black confronter. Instead, the opposite effect was found. White 
confrontation recipients experienced more guilt when the confronter was Black (i.e., 
target confronter) than when the confronter was White (i.e., non-target confronter). 
As Czopp et al. (2006) argue, the contradictory findings regarding whether target 
confronters cause more guilt may partly reflect the strength of the arguments used in the 
confrontation. The confrontation in Czopp and Monteith’s (2003) research featured a 
weak message (i.e., a message with only one argument1), whereas the confrontation used 
later in Czopp et al. featured a stronger argument.2 Other research examining the 
influence of source effects has similarly manipulated argument strength. This research 
has shown that having a Black source led to more effortful processing, regardless of 
attempts to manipulate distraction or issue involvement (White & Harkins, 1994). 
Persuasion models predict that participants are more persuaded by strong than weak 
messages when processing effort is high; however, participants are equally persuaded by 
strong and weak messages when processing effort is low. White and Harkins could not 
support these predictions when the source was Black. The presence of a Black source 
automatically led to greater processing effort, which was explained in terms of aversive 
racism. That is, cultural stereotypes about Blacks are negative, but egalitarian norms are 
strong regarding racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Thus, the mostly White participants 
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took extra care in weighing arguments made by a Black source to avoid appearing 
prejudiced, consistent with the theory of aversive racism. 
Thus, dual process persuasion theories can explain these contradictory findings of 
Czopp and Monteith (2003) and Czopp et al. (2006). A Black confronter always led 
confrontation recipients to engage in high effort processing of confrontation messages, 
which led argument strength to be evaluated. Under these conditions, as persuasion 
theories would predict, confrontation recipients who were led to effortfully process the 
message (due to ethnicity of the source and aversive racism) were more persuaded by 
strong than weak arguments. As shown in Table 1, participants felt less guilt when 
confronted by a Black confronter using a weak argument (Czopp & Monteith), because 
they engaged in high effort processing and recognized the argument as weak. A white 
confronter using a weak argument, however, may have caused guilt because participants 
were not engaging in high effort processing, which led to persuasion even with a weak 
argument. On the other hand, participants felt more guilt when confronted by a Black 
confronter using a strong argument (Czopp et al.) because they engaged in high effort 
processing and recognized the argument as strong. Because a White confronter may not 
automatically trigger high effort processing, participants do not attend to argument 
strength and are equally persuaded by strong and weak arguments. 
Czopp et al. (2006) also examined the consequences of confrontation on 
perpetrators’ later stereotypic responding. The researchers compared the number of 
stereotypic inferences made prior to and after confrontation. They found that fewer 
stereotypic inferences were made post-confrontation than prior to confrontation, and 
there was no interaction with ethnicity of the confronter. Regardless of the confronter’s 
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ethnicity, confronted participants showed less stereotypic responding and less prejudiced 
attitudes, as measured by pre- and post-confrontation attitudes, than did non-confronted 
participants. Whereas the findings regarding confrontation recipients’ guilt were 
seemingly contradictory based on confronter’s ethnicity, the findings regarding reduced 
stereotyping and prejudiced attitudes suggest that target status does not influence 
important outcomes of confrontation. Thus, it depends on one’s definition of effective 
confrontation—whether it is increased the confrontation recipient’s guilt or attitude 
change—that determines whether the source of confrontation affects the outcome. 
However, there is no evidence yet to support the notion that guilt motivates explicit 
attitude and behavior change. Indeed, Czopp et al. showed that attitude change in 
confrontation recipients did not depend on confronter ethnicity, whereas feelings of guilt 
did.  
Message 
Research has also examined aspects of the confrontation message that influence 
the effectiveness of confronting prejudice, including argument strength and hostility. The 
confrontation message’s argument strength was just discussed regarding its interaction 
with source, but message strength has yet to be manipulated within a single experiment. 
However, a recent study examined whether the number of arguments influences 
confrontation’s effect (Hillard & Ryan, 2011). Participants either attended to a 30-second 
public service announcement (PSA) confronting “that’s so gay” or a five-minute speech 
on anti-gay bullying and its consequences that featured the same PSA, which had been 
pre-tested to cause negative attitudes toward the slang use of gay and more positive 
attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. However, the number of arguments did not 
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influence attitude change. Participants in a control condition had more negative attitudes 
toward gay men and lesbians than participants who attended to the speech featuring the 
PSA or the PSA-only, who did not significantly differ. Assuming that more arguments 
represented a stronger argument overall, these findings support Czopp et al. (2006). That 
is, Czopp et al. showed that guilt depended on the source of the message, but attitude and 
behavior change did not. Similarly, the findings from Hillard and Ryan show that 
argument strength does not affect attitude change, but it might have influenced other 
outcomes like guilt and confronter evaluations. 
Manipulating the hostility of the confrontation message affects some but not all 
outcomes of confronting. Perpetrators have more accepting reactions to low-hostility 
confrontation (e.g., acknowledging bias and apologizing; Czopp et al., 2006), which 
feature egalitarian norms, than to high-hostility confrontations, which feature accusations 
of racism. This study showed that high hostility confrontations caused perpetrators to 
report more anger toward the confronter, more general discomfort, and less favorable 
evaluations of the confronter than low hostility confrontations. However, neither negative 
self-directed affect (e.g., guilt, shame, and disappointment toward the self) nor 
stereotypic responding following the confrontation depended on the hostility of the 
confrontation message. Across levels of hostility, confrontation was effective in 
decreasing stereotyping in perpetrators.  
Two other studies have similarly shown that, for sexism and heterosexism, 
message hostility affects evaluations of confronters but not effectiveness of 
confrontations. Low hostility, indirect confrontations similarly lead to more positive 
evaluations of confronters of sexism (Gervais & Hillard, 2011). Those who directly 
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confront using high-hostility accusations of sexism were more negatively rated than those 
who indirectly confront using low-hostility appeals to egalitarianism. Confrontation 
hostility, however, did not have an effect on participants’ attributions of sexism. 
Similarly, there was no difference in terms of behavior change following a confrontation 
of heterosexism based on message hostility, but high- (vs. low-) hostility messages 
caused more negative evaluations of the confronters (Hyers, 2010). However, men who 
imagined being confronted for sexual harassment rated a female confronter relatively 
positively regardless of confrontation hostility, but she was seen as more irritating if she 
used a high hostility message (Saunders & Senn, 2009). Thus, although interpersonal 
consequences of confronting (i.e., confronter evaluation) are sometimes influenced by the 
hostility of the confrontation message, confrontation messages can increase recognition 
of bias and decrease stereotypic responding and prejudiced behavior regardless of the 
hostility of the message. 
Persuasion theories, on the other hand, would suggest that a more hostile message 
should receive more effortful processing. HSM suggests that a more hostile message 
requires individuals to have more confidence in their position, which causes more 
effortful processing. However, people may be motivated to process confrontations with 
some effort regardless of the hostility of the message, because accusations of bias draw 
attention given strong egalitarian norms.  
Recipient/Audience 
Individual differences in the confrontation recipients, such as level of prejudice, 
influence the outcomes of confronting prejudice. Low (vs. high) prejudice people are 
expected to experience more negative self-directed affect if they transgress their 
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egalitarian standards (Devine et al., 1991). Low prejudice individuals would be expected 
to experience more negative self-directed affect if that transgression is then confronted. 
This prediction has some support; low-prejudice (vs. high) confrontation recipients 
experience both more negative self- and other-directed affect when confronted (Czopp et 
al., 2006; Study 3). Low prejudice participants decreased stereotypic responding more 
than high prejudice participants did following a confrontation, although confrontation led 
to significantly less stereotypic responding regardless of prejudice level (Czopp et al.). 
Further, decreased stereotyping was correlated with guilt, suggesting that although 
confrontation causes some guilt for high prejudice individuals, it causes more guilt (and 
thus less stereotyping) for low prejudice individuals.  
The greater guilt for confrontation of low than high prejudice individuals can be 
explained in terms of individual differences in issue relevance or importance. That is, low 
prejudice individuals have internalized egalitarian standards (Devine et al., 1991; Plant & 
Devine, 1998). Low prejudice individuals may thus be more motivated than high 
prejudice individuals to effortfully process confrontation messages. Low prejudice 
individuals may also have more knowledge concerning the issues surrounding prejudice 
and discrimination. Whereas more knowledge of the topic leads to more effortful 
processing, low knowledge leads to less effortful processing that relies on cues (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986).  
Further, more prejudiced confrontation recipients may face two interconnected 
obstacles (i.e., less knowledge and guilt) to high effort processing. When knowledge is 
low, the affective cues used in low effort processing become more important (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). Because high prejudice individuals may have low knowledge of the 
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issues surrounding prejudice, high prejudice individuals do not experience as much 
negative self-directed affect as low prejudice individuals. This lower level of negative 
self-directed affect may be part of the reason that high-prejudice individuals are not as 
influenced by confrontations of prejudice as low-prejudice individuals. It is of course 
unfortunate, as these are the individuals who may need to be confronted the most! 
Although there is no research on confronting prejudice that has examined this 
variable, I expect that need for cognition influences the outcomes of confronting. Those 
high in need for cognition enjoy effortful processing and are intrinsically motivated to do 
so in general (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Thus, if effortful processing changes attitudes 
following confrontation, those high in need for cognition should attend more to the 
strengths of arguments made during confronting prejudice. Those high in need for 
cognition should then be more persuaded by strong arguments and less persuaded by 
weak arguments than are those low in need for cognition. Future research placing 




The original prejudiced message provides a context for confronting prejudice. 
Three variables involving aspects of the prejudiced message may influence the outcomes 
of confronting prejudice, including the target of the prejudiced message, the 
offensiveness of the prejudiced message, and the source of the prejudiced message. 
Targets. The targets of the prejudiced statement may influence the outcome of 
confrontation because the acceptability of prejudice varies across targets (Fiske & 
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Stevens, 1993). That is, social norms against racism are stronger than norms against 
sexism or anti-gay prejudice (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). Two studies indicate that the 
same discriminatory action or prejudiced statement is viewed as more offensive and more 
prejudiced when the target is an ethnic minority rather than a woman or gay man  (Cowan 
& Hodge, 1996; Rodin, Price, Bryson, & Sanchez, 1990). Thus, Czopp and Monteith 
hypothesized that participants would anticipate feeling more apologetic when confronted 
about racism than about sexism. This hypothesis was supported; being accused of race 
bias resulted in more negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilt) and concern than did being 
accused of gender bias (Czopp & Monteith). Given that there was a correlation between 
negative self-directed affect and decreased stereotypic responding in later work (Czopp et 
al., 2006), this guilt was likely accompanied by decreased stereotypic responding. Thus, 
confronting race bias may be more effective than confronting gender or other bias. 
Offensiveness. The effectiveness of confronting prejudice also depends on the 
offensiveness of the prejudiced message. Prejudiced messages aimed at ethnic minority 
targets have been shown to be more offensive than similar messages aimed at other 
targets (Cowan & Hodge, 1996; Rodin et al., 1990). However, even within the same 
target, the effect of confrontation appears to depend on the offensiveness of the 
prejudiced statement.  
Specifically, Hillard and Ryan (2009) manipulated offensiveness in a recorded 
conversation (i.e., a statement including “that’s so gay” was rated as less offensive than 
the same statement including “homo,” which was included in the more offensive 
condition) and confrontation (whether confrontation occurred). Hearing a confrontation 
(vs. no confrontation) of “that’s so gay” resulted in more positive attitudes toward gays, 
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whereas hearing a confrontation of “homo” did not. In the “that’s so gay” condition, the 
confrontation produced more positive attitudes toward gays in observers than did the no 
confrontation condition. In the “homo” condition, however, the confrontation and no 
confrontation conditions had the same attitudes toward gays. Compared to a control 
condition, however, both the no confrontation and confrontation conditions for “homo” 
produced more positive attitudes toward gays. 
In this case, it may be that the confrontation draws the observers’ attention to the 
prejudice inherent in the less offensive statement (e.g., “that’s so gay)—prejudice that 
may otherwise go unnoticed—causing guilt. As suggested by Czopp et al. (2006), guilt 
may lead confrontation to be more effective. For more offensive statements (e.g., 
“homo”), however, prejudice is obvious; in this case, hearing a confrontation may 
alleviate guilt brought on by the prejudiced message, decreasing the confrontation 
effectiveness. The finding that attitudes towards gays did not significantly differ between 
participants that heard a confrontation of “that’s so gay” and participants that heard 
“homo” without a confrontation supports this interpretation. 
Source. Important aspects relating to the prejudiced message have just been 
reviewed, but what of the variables related to the person who says the prejudiced 
message? Research shows that, from the perspective of ingroup members and outgroup 
bystanders, intergroup criticism (i.e., criticism from an outgroup member towards another 
group or its members) appears to be an expression of prejudice, while intragroup 
criticism does not (i.e., criticism towards a group or its members from an ingroup 
member; Sutton, Douglas, Elder, & Tarrant, 2007). The difference between intergroup 
and intragroup criticism may be due to the intergroup sensitivity effect, which is the 
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“tendency to respond more favorably to internal than to external criticism of groups” 
(Sutton et al.).  
The intergroup sensitivity effect would suggest that the motivation for criticism is 
different based on group membership or identity. If an ingroup member voices criticism, 
it is assumed by others to be motivated by good intentions toward the group. On the other 
hand, the same criticism coming from an outgroup member would be interpreted to be 
motivated by prejudice, because the outgroup member should have no motivation to 
improve the group. In fact, this effect may not be limited to criticism. Expressing positive 
beliefs about a group as a whole, when coming from an outgroup member, leads that 
speaker to be negatively evaluated by others (i.e., is less liked and leaves a more negative 
impression; Mae & Carlston, 2005). Thus, criticisms or praise from an outgroup member 
are more likely attributed to prejudice than the same statements by an ingroup member. 
Because outgroup comments are more likely attributed to prejudice and recognizing a 
comment as prejudice is an important feature in the CPR model, I would expect that 
outgroup members are more likely to be confronted.  
While not all criticism or praise is motivated by prejudice, group membership and 
social identity of the speaker may influence bystanders’ perceptions of the motivation 
underlying the speaker’s comments. Thus, the source of the message may influence the 
offensiveness of a statement and whether the statement is viewed as prejudiced. 
Offensiveness and acceptability of prejudice may then go on to influence the 
effectiveness of confrontation. 
Integration of Prejudiced Message Context Variables. The research discussed 
in terms of the target, offensiveness, and source of the original prejudiced message is 
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interconnected and may be explained by dual-processing models. Confronting offensive 
messages may inspire effortful processing of confrontation messages, whether the 
messages are deemed offensive because of their target, source, or degree of intended 
harm. In some cases, it may be the offensiveness of the prejudiced message that captures 
attention and serves as a cue for elaboration, particularly for low prejudice individuals. 
The offensiveness of a statement may also depend on who is saying it, as identical 
statements may be seen as more offensive when made by outgroup than by ingroup 
members. In this way, offensiveness of the prejudiced message, whether through aspects 
of the target or the source of the message, may be causing more effortful processing and 
negative self-directed affect, which then increases the effectiveness of confrontation in 
the presence of strong arguments. 
Public vs. Private Context 
 One study examined the effect of physical context by manipulating whether the 
confrontation occurred publically or privately (Gervais & Hillard, 2011). The effect of 
context on leadership perceptions of the confronter depended on the confronter’s gender 
in a way that is consistent with gender role stereotypes. For a female confronter, overall 
leadership ratings were highest when she confronted privately. For a male confronter, 
overall leadership ratings were highest when he confronted publically. The same was true 
for ratings of competence, charisma, and helpfulness, but not respect, which was rated 
higher when confrontation was private rather than public regardless of confronter gender. 
The outcome that was the focus of the study was confronter evaluations, but this study 
also shows that perpetrators are considered more sexist when confrontation occurred in 
public rather than private. It may be because public confrontations led to more effortful 
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processing, and participants thus determined that the comment was more sexist. If private 
confrontations led to less effortful processing, participants would be less likely to 
determine that the comment was sexist. Thus, public but not private confrontations lead 
observers to believe the comment was more sexist. 
Audience Response 
The broader context for confrontation may at times include bystanders. The 
effectiveness of confrontation for these observers is influenced by the perpetrator’s 
response to the confrontation message. Rasinski and Czopp (2008) asked participants to 
imagine a confrontation scenario in which they were the observers; following a 
confrontation, the perpetrator had either an apologetic or hostile reaction. Type of 
perpetrator reaction (along with individuals’ level of prejudice) influenced observers’ 
ratings of their likelihood to confront prejudice in the future. For low prejudice observers, 
both apologetic and hostile reactions caused participants to be more likely to confront 
prejudice in the future and less likely to tell a prejudiced joke. For high prejudice 
observers, though, only an apologetic reaction from the perpetrator decreased the future 
likelihood of telling a prejudiced joke.  
These findings can again be explained in terms of levels of processing. Low 
prejudice observers are motivated to effortfully process the confrontation because of 
personal issue relevance, knowledge, and importance. For these low prejudice 
individuals, the response of the perpetrator did not determine effectiveness. Instead, they 
were persuaded by the confrontation arguments, which they attended to because of their 
motivation to be non-prejudiced. However, high prejudice observers are not motivated to 
effortfully process the confrontation because of low personal issue relevance, knowledge, 
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and importance. For high prejudice individuals, only an apologetic reaction led to 
increased elaboration. In this case, it may be that high prejudice observers were 
motivated to process the confrontation because they were unsure why the perpetrator 
needed to apologize. High prejudice individuals may see the apology as an unexpected 
response that is inconsistent with the perpetrator’s previous statement. The resulting 
surprise may cause high prejudice individuals to process the confrontation more 
effortfully than the confrontation followed by a hostile reaction.  
Further, although confrontations of prejudice do not have to be hostile, an 
argument would not be an unexpected result and might only involve low effort 
processing. It then makes sense that these expected, hostile reactions decreased the 
effectiveness of confrontations for high prejudice observers; they did not inspire high 
effort processing in high prejudice individuals. Thus, personal prejudice level and context 
cues, such as perpetrator reactions to being confronted about prejudice, interact and can 
be explained by low versus high effort processing. 
In support of this explanation, research has shown that interpretations of racial 
harassment depend greatly upon the harasser’s reaction to the instance (McClelland & 
Hunter, 1992; see also Swim et al., 2009). Participants imagined observing racism and 
rated the seriousness of situations differing in offensiveness. The account of the harasser 
had a greater influence on ratings of incident seriousness than did the account of the 
victim. In fact, this effect was such that harassers’ accounts had five times the influence 
of the victim’s account of the incident. Similarly, other work indicates that sexual 
harassers’ accounts have eight times the influence of victim accounts on ratings of 
incident seriousness (Hunter & McClelland, 1991).  Participants may use the response of 
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the harassers (and by extension, the perpetrators, who say the original prejudiced 
statement) as a cue for elaboration, whereas the response of the victims (and by 
extension, confronters) are discounted. As discussed before, perhaps confronters are 
discounted because the confronter is disliked and seen as a complainer (Kaiser & Miller, 
2001; Czopp et al., 2006) or acting out of self-interest (Petty et al., 2001). 
Outline of the Present Study 
 Confronting prejudice is an effective way to reduce prejudice and discrimination. 
Literature on confronting prejudice has examined characteristics related to confrontation 
message, source, recipient/audience, and context, which influence the outcomes of 
confronting for perpetrators and observers. Apparent contradictions in the literature may 
be explained by examining effort or elaboration of confrontation message. Thus, research 
on confronting can be integrated with existing theory on persuasion, which provides a 
model for future research. Further, examining confronting from an ELM/HSM 
perspective provides a more process-oriented view of the outcomes of confronting 
prejudice on recipients and observers. This perspective on confronting can then be tested 
empirically (e.g., by directly manipulating motivation and/or ability for effortful 
processing).  
One of the major limitations of the existing work on confronting is its 
examination of only short-term change in the laboratory. Although persuasion dissipates 
over time (Cook & Flay, 1978), persistence of attitude change is greater when individuals 
have the motivation and ability to elaborate on the message (Petty & Wegener, 1998). For 
example, messages concerning more interesting and involving issues (e.g., socio-political 
issues) lead to greater attitude change persistence than less involving issues (e.g., 
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information on past presidents; Ronis, Baumgardner, Leippe, Cacioppo, & Greenwald, 
1977). Further, individuals high (vs. low) on need for cognition show greater persistence 
of attitude change after a two-day delay (Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992). In addition, attitude 
change persistence is greater over a two- to five-month delay when participants are told 
they will explain an argument presented in the essay to others (vs. not told this; Boninger, 
Brock, Cook, Gruder, & Romer, 1990). Thus, those with motivation—whether that 
comes from an interesting issue, individual differences in need for cognition, or an 
experimental manipulation—elaborate on persuasive messages, which causes lasting 
attitude change. Based on this work, I expect that the effect of confronting prejudice 
would persist over time to the degree that the confrontation inspires effortful issue-
relevant elaboration.  
The present study examines the immediate and longer-term (i.e., after a delay 
lasting up to two weeks) effects of confronting (vs. not confronting) sexist jokes; it also 
manipulates participants’ elaboration of the confrontation message. I test three 
hypotheses derived from the literature on confronting prejudice and persuasion. First, I 
expected that confronting a sexist joke will cause less hostile attitudes toward women in 
the short-term (i.e., Hypothesis 1a) and less discrimination against women in the long-
term (i.e., Hypothesis 1b) among observers than will not confronting a joke. Second, I 
expected that elaboration (vs. no elaboration) of confrontation messages enhances the 
effectiveness of the confrontation in the short-term, causing greater attitude change and 
less discrimination (i.e., Hypothesis 2). Third, I expected that attitude change following 
confrontation lasts longer among those who engage in elaboration (vs. no elaboration) of 





The planning of the study and recruitment of participants was informed by power 
analyses. Based on past research (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006), I assumed a medium effect of 
confrontation that decreases over time. For a 70% chance of rejecting the null hypothesis 
that there is no difference between conditions if a difference truly exists, the target 
number of participants needed for the study at Time 3 was 150. I therefore attempted to 
recruit twice as many participants at Time 2, anticipating that many participants would 
not complete all three phases of the study. 
The recruitment procedures varied by phase of the study. Time 1 participants 
were recruited from students enrolled in psychology courses at the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln. These participants completed departmental mass screening, including 
measures relevant to this study, in exchange for partial course credit. Participants also 
indicated whether they wanted to be contacted by researchers for future studies. All Time 
1 participants were eligible to complete Time 2. Time 2 recruitment occurred either 
through an email invitation (for participants who provided permission for such contact) or 
through a departmental, online database for participant recruitment, which included 
completion of Time 1 as an eligibility requirement. During Time 2, participants were 
again asked if they would like to be contacted for a future study. Time 2 participants who 
provided their consent for future research either at Time 1 and/or Time 2 were eligible to 
complete Time 3 and invited to complete an online study via email. 
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Several items were included at each time point for the purpose of connecting 
participants’ data. Specifically, participants provided the last four digits of their phone 
number, their ACT score, and demographic information (i.e., age, gender, and ethnicity) 
at all time points. At Time 2 and 3, participants also provided their high school mascot. 
To connect participants from Time 2 to Time 1 and from Time 2 to Time 3, I initially 
used the last four digits of the phone number, and the additional items were used to 
confirm a participant’s identity.  
Using the procedure just described to identify and match participants’ data across 
phases of the study, there were a total of 304 participants at Time 1, 361 participants at 
Time 2, and 161 participants at Time 3. There is complete data (i.e., across all three time 
points) for 156 participants, of which 63.1% were women. Participants with complete 
data had a mean age of 19.44 years (SD = 2.77) and most identified as White/European 
American (87.9%), with 8.3% identifying as Hispanic/Latino American, 5.1% identifying 
as Asian American, 3.2% identifying as African American, and 0.6% identifying as 
Native American. (The percentages add up to more than 100% because some participants 
indicated multiple categories.)  
There is incomplete data (i.e, either Time 1 or 3 missing) for 205 participants, of 
which 54.1% were women. Participants with incomplete data had a mean age of 19.07 
years (SD = 1.99) and most identified as White/European American (85.8%), with 6.1% 
identifying as Asian American, 3.4% identifying as Hispanic/Latino American, 2.0% 
identifying as African American, 0.7% identifying as Native American, and 2.0% 
identifying as other.  
Procedure 
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Time 1: Pre-test. Participants completed pre-test measures through mass 
screening conducted online for participant selection within the Department of 
Psychology. The effect of elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation messages 
may depend on individual differences in motivation to process the sexist joke and/or 
confrontation. For example, personal involvement provides a motivation to increase 
effortful processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and individuals who think gender activism 
is important are likely to elaborate on confrontation messages. At Time 1, then, I 
measured individual differences in motivation to control sexism and gender activism as 
well as measures of attitudes and feelings toward women, as described below.  
Time 2: Laboratory Manipulation. Participants completed a study ostensibly 
examining perceptions of social interactions, as in Ford et al. (2008). Participants 
provided informed consent, received general instructions, and were randomly assigned to 
one of three conditions: no-confrontation control, confrontation-only, or 
confrontation+elaboration. Participants imagined themselves in situations presented in 
vignettes, which described interactions between co-workers, as shown in Appendix A. 
One vignette scenario included pre-tested sexist jokes (i.e., scenario #2; Ford et al., 2008) 
shared by three of the five co-workers. The manipulation of confrontation involved a co-
worker either not confronting the sexist jokes (i.e., control condition) or confronting the 
sexist jokes (i.e., confrontation conditions) using approximately three arguments (adapted 
from Czopp et al., 2006): “Have you thought about what that suggests about women? 
Women aren’t dumb or the only ones that do housework. You should try to think about 
women in less prejudiced ways… those jokes seem kind of sexist.” However, to assure 
that the manipulation of confrontation was not confounded with negativity, participants in 
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the control condition read a critique of the jokes that did not involve sexism but was still 
a negative evaluation of the jokes (adapted from Czopp et al.): “I thought some of those 
jokes seemed a little stupid. Couldn’t you think of anything better than that?”  
In order to manipulate elaboration of the confrontation message, participants were 
asked to write essays that either focused on the confrontation or not.4 Participants in the 
confrontation+elaboration condition wrote a one-page essay describing why the situation 
might be offensive to someone. Participants in the control and confrontation-only 
conditions wrote a one-page essay describing in detail their plans for the rest of the day, 
as in Burton and King (2004) and King and Miner (2000). To further strengthen the 
manipulation, participants were told that they would explain their essay to others, which 
is related to greater attitude change persistence (Boninger et al., 1990). Thus, participants 
in the confrontation+elaboration condition thought more about the confrontation, whereas 
participants in the control and confrontation-only conditions focused on something 
unrelated to the vignette, which was intended to inhibit their ability to elaborate on the 
confrontation. Participants then completed the dependent measures, including attitudes 
and feelings toward women, affect, and behavioral intentions. Finally, participants were 
thanked and provided with a general rather than specific debriefing statement, because 
there was an additional phase of the study. 
Time 3: Delayed Post-test. One day following their participation at Time 2, 
participants were invited (via contact information and permission provided at Time 1 or 
2) to complete Time 3, which was an ostensibly different study on how budget cuts 
should be implemented to student organizations on campus. To further differentiate this 
phase of the study, participants were offered $5 for their participation rather than partial 
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course credit. Participants were invited to complete an online questionnaire within one 
week and were sent a reminder email as that deadline approached. Participants who had 
not completed the survey within one week and had provided a phone number at Time 1 
were contacted and offered an additional extension for their participation (i.e., up to two 
weeks following Time 2). The mean time between Time 2 and 3 for the 159 participants 
for which this data is available was 3.97 days (SD = 3.14).  
During this phase, participants allocated organizational budgets, including the 
budget for a women’s organization, as shown in Appendix B (adapted from Ford et al., 
2008). Consistent with Ford et al., participants discriminated against women if they 
allocated more of the overall budget cut (20%) to the women’s organization. Participants 
also rated how they expected others to react to their budget cuts and completed measures 
of attitudes and feelings toward women. Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed, 
and received $5 (in cash they picked up later or to a PayPal account) for their 
participation. 
Measures 
 As shown in Table 2, participants completed most individual difference variables 
prior to the manipulation (i.e., either at Time 1 or before manipulations at Time 2). After 
the manipulations at Time 2 and at Time 3, participants completed items related to 
behavior, attitudes, and feelings toward women. 
Motivation to Control Sexism. At Time 1, participants completed the Internal 
and External Motivation to Respond Without Sexism Scales (Klonis, Plant, & Devine, 
2005). Participants responded to five items concerning internal motivation (e.g., “Being 
nonsexist toward women is important to my self concept”; ! = .81) and five items 
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concerning external motivation (e.g., “I try to act in nonsexist ways because of pressure 
from others”: ! = .73) on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). 
Gender Activism. At Time 1 or 2, participants completed the Gender Role 
Journey Scale’s subscale for personal-professional activism (O’Neil, Egan, Owen, & 
Murray, 2005). Participants responded to 13 items (e.g., “I reflect on my feelings about 
gender role conflict and then act on them”) on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), ! = .90. Some participants completed this 
measure at Time 1; other participants completed this measure at the conclusion of Time 2 
because of space restrictions on mass screening during the last semester of data 
collection. 
Need for Cognition. At Time 2 but prior to the lab manipulations, participants 
completed the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Participants 
responded to 18 items (e.g., the reverse-coded “I only think as hard as I have to” and “I 
prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve”) on a Likert-type scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), ! = .90. 
Need for Affect. At Time 2 but prior to the lab manipulations, participants 
completed the Need for Affect Scale (Maio & Esses, 2001). Participants responded to 13 
items concerning their tendencies to approach emotion (e.g., “I am a very emotional 
person”; ! = .83) and 13 items concerning their tendencies to avoid emotion (e.g., the 
reverse-coded “Displays of emotions are embarrassing”; ! = .86) on a Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
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Social Desirability. At Time 2 but prior to the lab manipulations, participants 
completed Ray’s (1984) short form of the social desirability scale. Participants responded 
to eight items (e.g., “Are you quick to admit making a mistake?” and “Are you always a 
good listener, no matter whom you are talking to?”) by indicating either Yes (coded as 1), 
Unsure (coded as 2), or No (coded as 3), ! = .58. 
Feeling Thermometers. At Time 1, 2 (post-manipulation), and 3, participants 
rated their feelings toward subgroups of women (i.e., women, homemakers, career 
women, feminists, and party girls; ! = .70 at Time 1) and men (i.e., men, male caretakers, 
career men, womanizers, and jokesters; ! = .66 at Time 1) as well as other, filler groups 
selected from the American National Election Studies survey to support the cover story 
(e.g., “people on welfare”) on a feeling thermometer ranging from 0 (very coolly) to 100 
(very warmly). 
Ambivalent Sexism Inventory. At Time 1, 2 (post-manipulation), and 3, 
participants completed Glick and Fiske’s (1996) measure of benevolent (! = .77 at Time 
1) and hostile sexism (! = .84 at Time 1). Participants responded to 22 items (e.g., 
“Women should be cherished and protected by men” for benevolent sexism and the 
reverse-coded “Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men” for hostile 
sexism) on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Positive and Negative Affect. Following the manipulations at Time 2, 
participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to measure affect. Participants responded to 10 items for 
positive affect (e.g., ““enthusiastic”; ! = .87) and 10 items for negative affect (e.g., 
“irritated”; ! = .87) on a scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 7 (extremely). 
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Participants completed portions of the expanded form of the PANAS (PANAS-X) on the 
same scale. Specifically, they completed the guilt subscale including six items (e.g., 
“ashamed” and “angry at self”; ! = .89) and the surprise subscale including three items 
(e.g., “amazed”; ! = .74). Similarly, participants completed items from Czopp et al. 
(2006) on the same scale for negative self- and other-directed affect in nine items (e.g., 
“regret”; ! = .93) and five items (e.g., “angry at others”; ! = .90), respectively. Finally, 
participants reported discomfort as in Czopp et al. using eight items (e.g., “tense” and 
“anxious”; ! = .85) on the same scale. 
Ratings of Scenarios, Jokes, and Speakers. Immediately following the 
manipulations at Time 2, participants rated how entertaining, humorous, and offensive 
overall the scenario was on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). Later at Time 2, 
participants indicated their liking of each individual joke on a Likert-type scale ranging 
from 1 (disliked strongly) to 7 (liked strongly).  
Also, participants rated how much they liked each of the five speakers on a 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (disliked strongly) to 7 (liked strongly) as well as how 
reasonable they found each of the speakers’ behaviors on a Likert-type scale ranging 
from 1 (not reasonable) to 7 (very reasonable). Ratings of liking and reasonableness 
were combined across the three speakers who shared a sexist joke (i.e., Michael, Donna, 
and Cindy, as shown in Appendix A), ! = .88, and for the speaker who evaluated the 
jokes negatively (i.e., either confronted or not), ! = .80. 
Behavioral Intentions. Following the manipulations at Time 2, participants 
indicated how likely they were to use sexist jokes/statements (e.g. “In the future, how 
likely are you to make statements demeaning women to others”; ! = .79) and confront 
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sexism in the future (e.g. “In the future, how likely are you to confront someone using 
sexist jokes”; ! = .89). Participants rated their agreement on a scale ranging from 1 (not 
at all likely) to 7 (very likely).  
Perceived Attention and Attitude Certainty. Following the manipulations at 
Time 2, participants indicated their perceived amount of attention to the sexist jokes and 
attitude certainty, using items adapted from Barden and Petty (2008). Participants 
indicated how much attention they paid to the vignette and jokes using two questions 
(e.g., “To what extent did you take the time you needed to carefully read the last jokes 
and statements?”) on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (definitely), ! = .76. 
Participants indicated how certain they were of their attitudes using three questions (e.g., 
“How confident are you of your opinion about the jokes?”) on a scale ranging from 1 (not 
at all) to 7 (very), ! = .97. 
Budget Cut Norms. At Time 3, participants rated how they expect others in the 
immediate context (i.e., local norms) and other students in general (i.e., general norms) to 
react to their budget allocations for each organization on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disapprove) to 7 (strongly approve).  
Attitudes Toward Social Organizations. At Time 3, participants rated their 
feelings toward the organizations in the budget task on a scale ranging from 1 (very 
negative) to 7 (very positive) as well as how important they consider each organization on 
a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (very unimportant) to 6 (very important) and how 
wisely each group will spend the allocated money on a scale ranging from 1 (not wisely) 
to 7 (very wisely). These three items were used to create a composite variable for attitude 
toward each organization. 
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Feelings Toward Organizations. At Time 3, participants rated their feelings 
toward groups relevant to the social organizations (e.g., “Jews” and “agriculture 






 To test my hypotheses concerning the effects of confrontation (vs. no 
confrontation) and elaboration (vs. no elaboration) of confrontation messages, I examined 
the effect of condition (i.e., no confrontation control, confrontation-only, or 
confrontation+elaboration) on measures included at one time point as well as measures 
included across time points (i.e., benevolent sexism, ambivalent sexism, and feeling 
thermometers toward women). First, I examined the effects of condition on dependent 
variables measured only at Time 2 or 3 using one-way between-subjects analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) or mixed model ANOVAs including a within-subjects factor where 
appropriate. I also examined whether there were interactions between condition and 
participant gender that influenced Time 2 and 3 dependent variables using, for example, 3 
(condition) ! 2 (gender) between subjects ANOVAs. Unless otherwise noted, participant 
gender did not qualify the results of condition. Second, I examined the change over time 
in longitudinal dependent variables through a series of multilevel models, including 
unconditional, missingness, multivariate, and finally conditional models. 
Effects of Confrontation and Elaboration at Time 2 
 Positive and Negative Affect. One-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine 
the effect of condition (control vs. confrontation vs. confrontation+elaboration) on 
positive affect, negative affect, surprise, guilt, negative self-directed affect, negative 
other-directed affect, and discomfort. Omnibus tests indicated significant differences 
across condition for surprise, F(2, 355) = 5.10, MSE = 1.16, p < .01, and discomfort, F(2, 
355) = 4.36, MSE = 0.78, p < .05; there were also marginal differences based on 
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condition for negative affect, F(2, 355) = 2.57, MSE = 0.81, p = .08; negative self-
directed affect, F(2, 355) = 2.42, MSE = 0.99, p = .09, and negative other-directed affect, 
F(2, 355) = 2.92, MSE = 1.36, p = .055. As shown in Table 3, focused tests (i.e., LSD 
pairwise comparisons) revealed that participants in the confrontation-only condition 
experienced less surprise and discomfort than did participants in both the control and 
confrontation+elaboration conditions. In addition, participants in the confrontation-only 
condition experienced less negative affect and negative other-directed affect than did 
participants in the confrontation+elaboration condition. 
 Ratings of Scenario and Jokes. Separate one-way ANOVAs were estimated to 
examine the effects of condition on participants’ ratings of the extent to which the 
scenario including sexist jokes was humorous, entertaining, and offensive. However, 
there were no significant effects of condition according to both omnibus tests, ps > .23, 
and focused tests, ps > .17.  
To examine the effect of condition on participants’ liking of specific sexist and 
neutral jokes included in the scenario, a 3 (condition, between subjects) ! 2 (participant 
gender, between subjects) ! 2 (joke type, within subjects: sexist, neutral) mixed ANOVA 
was estimated. The effect of joke type was significant, F(1, 350) = 29.11, MSE = 1.84, p 
< .001, but was qualified by a significant interaction between joke type and participant 
gender, F(1, 350) = 48.69, MSE = 1.84, p < .001. As shown in Table 4, participants 
generally liked neutral jokes more than sexist jokes; however, women liked sexist jokes 
less than men did, p < .05, whereas women and men equally liked neutral jokes. Still, 
there was no significant effect of condition or its interaction with joke type or gender, ps 
> .17.  
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 Ratings of Speakers. To examine the effect of condition on participants’ 
evaluations of speakers who either shared sexist jokes, a 3 (condition) ! 2 (participant 
gender) between subjects ANOVA was estimated. The only significant effect was a main 
effect of gender, F(1, 351) = 54.31, MSE = 1.44, p < .001, which indicated that women 
(M = 3.14, SD = 1.21) rated the speakers of sexist jokes more negatively than men (M = 
4.12, SD = 1.18); all other ps > .43.  
Because confronters in previous research were sometimes evaluated negatively 
(e.g., Kaiser & Miller, 2004), a parallel analysis was conducted for participants’ 
evaluations of Paula, the speaker who either confronted or gave a negative evaluation of 
the jokes. There was a significant main effect of gender, F(1, 351) = 12.72, MSE = 1.98, 
p < .001, which indicated that women (M = 4.95, SD = 1.42) rated Paula more positively 
than men (M = 4.39, SD = 1.41). There also was a marginal interaction between gender 
and condition, F(2, 351) = 2.30, MSE = 1.98, p = .10. As shown in Table 5, women’s 
ratings of Paula were more positive when Paula confronted prejudice (i.e., in the 
confrontation-only condition) than when Paula did not confront prejudice (i.e., in the 
control condition), p < .01; however, men’s ratings of the confronter did not differ by 
condition, p > .50. 
 Behavioral Intentions. Separate one-way ANOVAs indicated that there was no 
effect of condition on intentions to use sexist jokes and statements, F(2, 357) < 1, or 
intentions to confront sexism, F(2, 357) = 1.72, MSE = 2.67, p > .18; focused tests also 
indicated no differences based on condition, ps > .10. 
 Perceived Processing and Attitude Certainty. Separate one-way ANOVAs 
indicated that there was no effect of condition on perceived attention paid to the jokes, 
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F(2, 357) = 2.35, MSE = 1.36, p = .10, or attitude certainty, F(2, 357) = 2.10, MSE = 
1.70, p = .13. Focused tests (p < .05), however, indicated that participants in the 
confrontation+elaboration condition (M = 5.25, SD = 1.10) perceived paying more 
attention to the jokes than did participants in the confrontation-only condition (M = 4.95, 
SD = 1.30). In addition, participants in the confrontation+elaboration condition (M = 
5.56, SD = 1.29) felt more certain about their attitudes toward the jokes than did 
participants in the confrontation-only condition (M = 5.22, SD = 1.37).  
 Donation. A one-way ANOVA indicated that there was a marginal effect of 
condition on the amount ($0-20) participants reported being willing to donate to a 
women’s organization, F(2, 354) = 3.02, MSE = 38.17, p = .05. According to focused 
tests (p = .015), participants in the confrontation+elaboration condition (M = $8.25, SD = 
$7.04) donated more than did participants in the control condition (M = $6.27, SD = 
$5.10). In partial support of Hypothesis 2, participants who elaborated on a confrontation 
message donated more to a women’s organization than did control participants. 
Previous research examined the effects of sexist jokes on hostile sexist men (Ford 
et al., 2008). Thus, I estimated a 3 (condition) ! 2 (gender) analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) with hostile sexism as a covariate. There were significant main effects of 
gender, F(1, 347) = 21.88, MSE = 34.20, p < .001, and condition, F(2, 347) = 3.60, MSE 
= 34.20, p < .03, and hostile sexism was a significant covariate, F(1, 347) = 9.74, MSE = 
34.20, p < .01. Again, participants in the confrontation+elaboration condition donated 
more than participants in the control condition did, but women (M = $8.80, SD = $6.36) 
donated more than men did (M = $5.22, SD = $5.33). However, there was not a 
significant interaction between gender and condition, F(2, 347) < 1. 
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 In Hypothesis 2, I predicted that elaboration (vs. no elaboration) of confrontation 
messages decreases discrimination. Because people with higher need for cognition are 
likely to engage in more elaboration regardless of experimental condition, I examined 
whether need for cognition, condition, and/or their interaction influenced donation. Need 
for cognition was not directly related to the amount participants were willing to donate, 
r(355) = .05, p > .32. Across three separate regression models, I predicted donation with 
need for cognition (centered at midpoint), one contrast code for condition (i.e., either 1 = 
control, -1 = confrontation-only; 1 = confrontation-only, -1 = confrontation+elaboration; 
or 1 = control, -1 = confrontation+elaboration), and the interaction between need for 
cognition and the contrast code. None of the interactions between the contrast code for 
condition and need for cognition were significant, ps > .59. Thus, need for cognition does 
not qualify the results of condition, contrary to Hypothesis 2. 
 Time 2 Summary. Participants in the confrontation+elaboration condition 
experienced more surprise, discomfort, negative affect, and negative other-directed affect 
than did participants in the confrontation-only condition. Participants in the 
confrontation+elaboration condition also reported paying more attention to the jokes and 
were more certain about their attitudes toward the jokes than participants in the 
confrontation+elaboration condition, which indicates that the manipulation of elaboration 
was effective. In addition, women but not men more positively evaluated a speaker who 
spoke up about prejudice (as in the confrontation-only condition) rather than not 
confronting prejudice (as in the control condition). Finally, participants in the 
confrontation+elaboration condition donated more to a women’s organization than did 
participants in the control condition. This finding partially supports Hypothesis 2 that 
 62 
elaboration on confrontation increases the effectiveness of confrontation. However, need 
for cognition (i.e., an individual difference related to one’s tendency to elaborate) was not 
related to donation and did not interact with condition, which is contrary to Hypothesis 2. 
Effects of Confrontation and Elaboration at Time 3 
Budget Discrimination. Separate one-way ANOVAs were estimated to examine 
the effects of condition on both the percent of the participant’s total budget cut (i.e., 
approximately $30,000 overall, across seven organizations) allocated to the women’s 
organization and the absolute amount cut from the women’s organization budget, which 
started at $24,050. Although there was no significant effect of condition for percentage of 
cut allocated to the women’s organization, F(2, 154) = 1.13, MSE = 49.27, p > .32, there 
was a marginal effect of condition on amount cut from the women’s organization, F(2, 
156) = 2.85, MSE = 7,714,904.86, p = .06. Focused tests (p < .05) indicated that 
participants in the control condition (M = $5,883.15, SD = $3,733.28) cut more from the 
women’s organization than did participants in either the confrontation-only (M = 
$4,800.08, SD = $2,634.29; p = .04) or confrontation+elaboration (M = $4,706.98, SD = 
$1,438.29; p = .04) conditions, who cut similar amounts, p > .83. In support of 
Hypothesis 1b concerning the effect of confrontation (vs. no confrontation), participants 
in both confrontation conditions cut approximately $1,000 less from the women’s 
organization than did participants in the control condition. However, contrary to 
Hypothesis 2 concerning the effect of elaboration (vs. no elaboration), there was no 
additional decrease in discrimination for elaborating on the confrontation message. 
 I next examined whether need for cognition, condition, and/or their interaction 
influenced discrimination. Need for cognition was not directly related to the percent or 
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amount cut from the women’s organization by participants, r(157) = .06, p > .47 and 
r(157) = .05, p > .55, respectively. Across three separate regression models, I predicted 
donation with need for cognition (centered at midpoint), one contrast code for condition 
(i.e., either 1 = control, -1 = confrontation-only; 1 = confrontation-only, -1 = 
confrontation+elaboration; or 1 = control, -1 = confrontation+elaboration), and the 
interaction between need for cognition and the contrast code. None of the interactions 
between the contrast code for condition and need for cognition were significant, ps > .44. 
These analyses do not support the idea that elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on 
confrontation messages (through condition, individual differences in need for cognition, 
and/or their interaction) decreases discrimination, which is contrary to Hypothesis 2.  
Perceived Budget Cut Norms. To examine the effect of condition on 
participants’ perceptions of local and general norms, a 3 (condition, between subjects) ! 
7 (organization, within subjects) mixed ANOVA was estimated. There was a significant 
main effect of organization on local norms, F(6, 900) = 8.24, MSE = 1.41, p < .001. 
Focused tests between the women’s organization and all other organizations indicated 
that participants perceived greater local agreement with their cuts to the women’s 
organization (M = 4.08, SD = 1.50) than the study abroad program (M = 3.69, SD = 1.68), 
p = .01. Participants also perceived greater local agreement with their cuts to cinema club 
(M = 4.58, SD = 1.63) than the women’s organization, p < .001. However, there was no 
effect of condition or interaction between condition and organization on local norms, ps > 
.29. 
For general norms, there was a significant main effect of organization, F(6, 918) = 
24.19, MSE = 1.32, p < .001. Focused tests between the women’s organization and all 
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other organizations indicated that participants perceived greater general agreement with 
their cuts to the Jewish organization (M = 4.56, SD = 1.33) than the women’s 
organization (M = 4.10, SD = 1.29), p < .001. Participants also perceived more general 
agreement with their cuts to the women’s organization than the study abroad program (M 
= 3.43, SD = 1.64; p < .001) or Black student union (M = 3.77, SD = 1.40; p = .001), but 
more general agreement for participants’ cuts from cinema club (M = 4.78, SD = 1.59) 
than the women’s organization, ps < .001. However, there was no effect of condition or 
interaction between condition and organization on general norms, ps > .58. 
Because past research on the effects of sexist jokes on perceived norms was 
conducted on men (Ford et al., 2008), I conducted a 3 (condition) ! 2 (gender) between 
subjects ANOVA on perceived local and general norms. For local norms, there was a 
marginal interaction between condition and gender, F(2, 155) = 2.70, MSE = 2.21, p = 
.07; all other ps > .15. As shown in Table 6, men and women perceived similar local 
norms in the control condition. In the confrontation conditions, however, men perceived 
less agreement with their cuts to the women’s organization than did women. For general 
norms, there was a significant main effect of gender, F(1, 151) = 3.93, MSE = 1.67, p < 
.05; all other ps > .61. Again, men (M = 3.81, SD = 1.22) perceived less general 
agreement with their cuts to the women’s organization than did women (M = 4.22, SD = 
1.32). 
 Attitudes Toward Organizations. To examine the effect of condition on 
participants’ attitudes toward organizations, a 3 (condition, between subjects) ! 7 
(organization, within subjects) mixed ANOVA was estimated. There was a significant 
main effect of organization on attitudes, F(6, 936) = 66.40, MSE = 0.76, p < .001. 
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Focused tests (p = .001) between the women’s organization and all other organizations 
indicated that participants had less positive attitudes toward the women’s organization (M 
= 4.51, SD = 1.17) compared to four other organizations (Agricultural: M = 5.02, SD = 
1.05; Safe Arrival: M = 5.19, SD = 1.20; Study abroad: M = 5.60, SD = 1.10; Black 
Union: M = 4.76, SD = 1.16). Participants had more positive attitudes toward the 
women’s organization than the cinema organization (M = 3.90, SD = 1.26). However, 
there was no effect of condition or interaction between condition and organization, ps > 
.14. 
 Time 3 Summary. Consistent with Hypothesis 1b that confrontation (vs. no 
confrontation) decreases discrimination, participants in the confrontation-only and 
confrontation+elaboration conditions discriminated against women less than participants 
in the control condition did. However, contrary to Hypothesis 2, there was no additional 
effect of elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation; participants in the 
confrontation conditions cut equivalent amounts from a women’s organization on the 
budget task. Also, contrary to Hypothesis 2, individual differences in need for cognition 
and its interaction with condition were not related to discrimination. Finally, 
confrontation shifted perceived social norms. Specifically, men in confrontation 
conditions perceived less local agreement with their budget cuts to a women’s 
organization than did men in the control condition. 
Longitudinal Dependent Variables: Analytic Rationale 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 concerned the longitudinal effects of confrontation (vs. no 
confrontation) and/or elaboration (vs. no elaboration) of confrontation messages on 
attitude and feeling variables (i.e., benevolent sexism, ambivalent sexism, and feeling 
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thermometers for subtypes of women). I examined these hypotheses using a multilevel 
approach for several reasons. Because the same participants completed the measures 
across three time points, there was dependency in the data that can be modeled through 
either repeated measures ANOVA or multilevel modeling. However, there were unequal 
intervals between time points. A traditional ANOVA framework collapses across these 
unequal intervals (i.e., forcing all data points together at “Time 3”), whereas a multilevel 
approach models change as a function of exact time that has passed since the 
manipulation (i.e., 1-14 days). In addition, there was missing data, and ANOVA 
examines only complete data (i.e., participants present at Time 1, 2, and 3), whereas 
multilevel modeling allows for some use of incomplete data that ANOVA would 
eliminate (i.e., participants who completed only Time 1 and 2 or Time 2 and 3). Finally, 
although both ANOVA and multilevel approaches allow for the inclusion of covariates, 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) assumes that the relationship between the covariate 
and the dependent variable is the same across groups (i.e., homogeneity of regression 
slopes). However, multilevel modeling does not make this assumption, and the effect of a 
covariate can depend on condition, for example. Because a multilevel approach is 
advantageous for unbalanced time, incomplete data, and covariates, I investigated my 
hypotheses concerning change over time using multilevel modeling. 
In order to examine the overall pattern of individual differences in longitudinal 
dependent variables, SAS PROC MIXED was used to estimate a series of models. Initial 
analyses provided descriptive information about the data. Next, unconditional models 
(i.e., including no predictors) were estimated in order to properly situate time in the 
models. Missingness analyses then were undertaken to examine whether participants who 
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completed Time 3 differed from participants who did not, which allowed for any 
differences to be accounted for in the conditional models. Next, multivariate models were 
undertaken to examine whether the patterns of change in the feeling thermometer items 
were similar across subtypes, which indicated whether a composite variable is 
appropriate for these items when testing conditional models. Finally, conditional models 
were estimated to examine the effects of predictors including condition, gender, and need 
for cognition and directly test Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3.  
Across all of these models, maximum likelihood (ML) was used to assess the 
significance of random or fixed effects, which is appropriate because of the larger sample 
size in the study. Degrees of freedom were estimated using the Satterthwaite method. 
Participants’ benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, and feeling thermometers toward 
subtypes of women were measured before the manipulation (Time 1), immediately 
following the lab manipulation (Time 2), and 1-14 days after manipulation (Time 3), 
leading to three total occasions of measurement. Time was centered at Time 2; thus, 
intercepts represent sexism or feelings measured immediately following the lab 
manipulation in all models. However, time could be treated in the model as either 
measurement occasion (i.e., -1, 0, 1) or days before (for Time 1) and after (for Time 3) 
the lab manipulation. Both options were assessed in the analyses that follow. 
First, I examined whether there was any change over time in longitudinal 
variables. A random intercept model was specified to produce the interclass correlation 
(ICC), which indicated the proportion of the variation that exists between and within 
persons. The ICC for benevolent and hostile sexism was .73 and .75, respectively, which 
indicated that 73-75% of variation in sexism is between persons and 27% or 25% of the 
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variation is within person (i.e., over time). The ICC range across feeling thermometers 
toward subtypes of women was .36 to .60, which indicated that 36-60% of the variation 
in feeling thermometers is between persons and 40-64% of the variation is within person. 
Thus, feeling thermometers were more variable over time than sexism. 
Second, a random intercept only model with saturated means was specified as a 
baseline model. This model was used to create a plot of the individual means for each 
longitudinal dependent measure. Individual trajectories seem to indicate change (increase 
or decrease) at Time 2, as shown in Figure 5 for hostile sexism. Although unconditional 
models of change centered at Time 2 were pursued, alternative conceptions of time were 
considered before adding predictors, because the effects of predictors are specified as a 
function of the time parameters in the model. Piecewise rather than polynomial models 
were used because the lab manipulation was expected to be the source of any change, and 
time was not equal interval in the study. Two piecewise variables were created; one 
represented the slope between Time 1 and 2 (i.e., slope12), and another represented the 
slope between Time 2 and 3 (i.e., slope23). 
Unconditional Models for Longitudinal Dependent Variables 
 Covariance Structure. Because the same participants completed the same 
measures (i.e., ASI and feeling thermometers) over three time points, there was 
dependency in the data. To ensure that dependency was adequately taken into account 
when producing standard estimates for the fixed effects, the covariance matrix was 
modeled by estimating three alternative covariance structures across the seven 
longitudinal dependent variables (i.e., benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, and five feeling 
thermometers for subtypes of women). For each dependent variable, the unstructured 
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covariance model was the baseline for comparison to compound symmetry (CS; i.e., both 
variance and covariance as constant) and compound symmetry-heterogeneous (CSH; i.e., 
separate variances but constant covariance) models. ML likelihood ratio tests, AIC, and 
BIC were used to compare these nested variance structures. 
 Across measures of sexism, the unstructured covariance model produced 
significantly better fit than the CS model, ML deviance difference (4) = 16.90, p < .01, 
and (4) = 44.60, p < .001, respectively for benevolent and hostile sexism. The 
unstructured covariance model also produced significantly better fit than did the CSH 
model, ML deviance difference (2) = 16.00, p < .001, and (2) = 41.60, p < .001, 
respectively for benevolent and hostile sexism. Across four feeling thermometer items, 
the unstructured covariance model produced significantly better fit than CS (ML 
deviance difference ranging from [4] = 17.60 to 43.10, p ! .001) or CSH (ML deviance 
difference ranging from [2] = 9.80 to 13.30, p < .01). The exception was feelings toward 
feminists, for which CS was adequate compared to unstructured covariance, ML deviance 
difference (4) = 4.60, p = .33. However, to ensure that any differences in effects were not 
due to the underlying covariance structures, the unstructured covariance model was used 
for all dependent variables; unstructured covariance fits all dependent variables perfectly 
but used more degrees freedom than necessary for the feminist feeling thermometer for 
which a simpler, more restrictive structure fit adequately. Because unstructured 
covariance models allow the variances and covariances over time to be what they were, 
no random effects of time were necessary.  
Real Versus Balanced Time. Time in these models could be estimated in terms 
of occasion of measurement (e.g., -1, 0, 1 respectively for Time 1, 2, and 3) and/or time 
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in days before/after Time 2. To examine how to best represent time in the model, a series 
of unconditional models was estimated in which real time in days was included as a 
moderator. These models include only participants with complete data in order to make 
comparison possible across models (i.e., differences were not due to varying numbers of 
participants at time points). The baseline model included the two piecewise variables and 
a random intercept. Including days between Time 1 and 2 (centered) as a moderator (i.e., 
including its main effect and interactions between each piecewise slope) did not improve 
model fit for benevolent or hostile sexism, ML deviance difference (3) = 1.50, p = .68, 
and (3) = 2.60, p = .46, respectively. Including days between Time 1 and 2 as a 
moderator also did not improve model fit for feeling thermometer items, ML deviance 
difference (3) = 0.40 to 3.80, p > .28. Thus, change between Time 1 and 2 was not 
dependent on the amount of time that passed between the pre-test and lab manipulation. 
Compared to the baseline model with two piecewise slopes and a random 
intercept, including days between Time 2 and 3 (centered) as a moderator did not 
improve model fit for benevolent or hostile sexism, ML deviance difference (3) = 3.20, p 
= .36, and (3) = 6.00, p = .11, respectively. Including days between Time 2 and 3 as a 
moderator also did not improve model fit for feeling thermometer items, ML deviance 
difference (3) = 0.40 to 4.60, p > .20. Thus, change between Time 2 and 3 was not 
dependent on the amount of time that passed between the lab manipulation and post-test, 
which challenged the underlying assumption of Hypothesis 3 that the effect of the lab 
manipulation fades over time.  
These analyses indicated that representing time more coarsely through occasion of 
measurement does not lose information compared to representing time more exactly 
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through days before/after Time 2. As such, time was balanced in all following models, 
with occasion of measurement used to create piecewise slopes between Time 1 and 2 as 
well as Time 2 and 3. In addition, using occasion of measurement to represent time 
allowed all data (vs. only complete data) to be used in the following models. 
Missingness Analysis for Longitudinal Dependent Variables 
To examine whether participants who completed Time 3 differed from 
participants who did not return for Time 3, pattern mixture models were estimated. A 
dummy coded variable was created that represented whether participants had completed 
Time 3 (i.e., did not complete = 0, completed = 1), which was included as a covariate in 
the unstructured model with piecewise slopes. Tests of fixed effects indicated that the 
effect was not significant for benevolent or hostile sexism, b = -0.06, SE = 0.09, p = .47, 
and b = -0.10, SE = 0.10, p = .30, respectively.  
Similarly, the effect of whether participants completed Time 3 was not significant 
for feelings toward career women and feminists, ps > .27. However, the predictor was 
significant for feelings toward women, b = 3.85, SE = 1.65, p = .02; homemakers, b = 
3.81, SE = 1.87, p < .05; and party girls, b = -6.18, SE = 2.65, p = .02. Participants who 
completed Time 3 had more positive feelings toward women and homemakers as well as 
more negative feelings toward party girls than participants who did not complete Time 3. 
Next, the interaction between completion of Time 3 (dummy coded) and the 
piecewise slope indexing change from Time 1 to Time 2 was added to the models. The 
interaction was not significant for benevolent or hostile sexism, b = -0.03, SE = 0.08, p = 
.68, and b = 0.13, SE = 0.09, p = .15, respectively. Similarly, none of the interactions 
were significant in separate tests of responses to the feeling thermometer, all ps > .19. 
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The significant main effects of whether participants completed Time 3 were carried 
through to multivariate and conditional models for feelings toward women, homemakers, 
and party girls, which controled for these effects related to completion of Time 3. (Thus, 
any conditional effects were not due to the more positive feelings toward women shown 
by participants who completed Time 3.) 
Multivariate Analyses of Longitudinal Dependent Variables 
To examine whether changes in feelings toward women depended on the specific 
subtype of women, multivariate analyses that directly compare subtypes were necessary. 
If patterns of change were similar across subtypes, a composite variable for feelings 
toward women was appropriate in conditional models. However, if patterns of change 
were different across subtypes, feelings toward specific subtypes of women, rather than a 
composite variable, should be used to examine conditional effects. 
A model was estimated with a categorical variable that represented which subtype 
of women and its with each slope (i.e., Time 1 to 2 and Time 2 to 3). ESTIMATE 
statements were used to obtain focused tests between feelings toward subtypes of women. 
The intercepts, slopes, and focused tests for each subtype of women are shown in Table 
7. Focused tests indicated that feelings at Time 2 (i.e., the fixed intercept) were more 
positive for women than career women; career women than homemakers; and 
homemakers than feminists and party girls, who had equivalent feeling ratings.  
However, the focus of this analysis is patterns of change over time. Focused tests 
for slope12 indicated that the significant increase in positive feelings toward women, 
career women, and homemakers from Time 1 to 2 differed from the non-significant (or 
marginally negative) change in feelings toward feminists and party girls. Focused tests 
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for slope23 indicated that feelings toward feminists became more positive from Time 2 to 
3, which differs from the non-significant (or marginally negative) change in feelings 
toward women, career women, homemakers, and party girls. The patterns of change in 
attitudes were different for feminists (i.e., from Time 1 to 2 and Time 2 to 3) and party 
girls (i.e., from Time 1 to 2) than the other subtypes, which suggested that conditional 
effects for feelings toward feminists and party girls should be examined separately. 
However, this analysis also indicated that a composite variable of the other subtypes (i.e., 
women, career women, and homemakers) was appropriate. Thus, conditional effects for 
feeling thermometers were subsequently examined for feelings toward feminists, party 
girls, and a composite variable for women. 
Conditional Models for Longitudinal Dependent Variables 
 To examine Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 concerning attitude change, the time-invariant 
(level-2) predictor for condition and its interactions with each slope were added to the 
best fitting unconditional piecewise model selected from preliminary analyses. Thus, the 
model estimated for each longitudinal dependent variable (i.e., benevolent sexism, hostile 
sexism, feelings toward women, feelings toward feminists, and feelings toward party 
girls) included a slope between Time 1 and 2, slope between Time 2 and 3, condition, the 
interaction between slope12 and condition, and the interaction between slope23 and 
condition. In addition, feelings toward women and feelings toward party girls included 
the effect of whether participants completed Time 3, given the result of the missingness 
analyses. Condition was parameterized such that the control is the reference (control vs. 
confrontation-only; control vs. confrontation+elaboration). ESTIMATE statements were 
used to obtain the missing contrast (confrontation-only vs. confrontation+elaboration).  
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For benevolent and hostile sexism, adding the effect of condition and its 
interaction with slopes did not improve model fit, ML deviance difference (3) = 2.60, p > 
.45, and (3) = 2.10, p > .55, respectively. As shown in Table 8, there also was no 
significant change in benevolent or hostile sexism from Time 1 to 2 or Time 2 to 3. 
However, there was a marginal decrease in hostile sexism between Time 1 and 2 for the 
confrontation+elaboration condition. There also were no significant focused tests 
between conditions for the intercept or piecewise slopes, ps > .15. Although I predicted 
through Hypothesis 1 and 2 that confrontation (vs. no confrontation) and elaboration (vs. 
no elaboration) of confrontation messages would decrease sexism, there is little support 
for these predictions. However, the (marginal) decrease in hostile sexism from Time 1 to 
2 for the confrontation+elaboration condition is consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
For feelings toward women from Time 1 to 2, including the effects of condition 
did not significantly improve model fit, ML deviance difference (3) = 5.10, p > .16. 
Nevertheless, the simple slopes in Table 8 show that participants in the confrontation-
only and confrontation+elaboration conditions were more positive toward women from 
Time 1 to 2. However, there was no significant change in feelings toward women for 
participants in the control condition. Focused tests for the slope between Time 1 and 2 by 
condition further indicated that the confrontation-only slope was significantly more 
positive than the control, b = 7.36, SE = 2.43, p < 0.01; this finding is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1a, as participants’ feelings toward women became more positive for the 
confrontation-only condition than they did in the control condition. In addition, the slope 
between Time 1 and 2 for the confrontation+elaboration condition was marginally more 
positive than the control condition, b = 4.22, SE = 2.45, p = 0.09. However, the 
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confrontation conditions did not significantly differ from each other, p > .18, which is 
contrary to Hypothesis 2 that elaboration increases attitude change in the short-term 
compared to the confrontation-only condition.  
Participants in the confrontation-only condition were less positive toward women 
from Time 2 to 3. Focused tests for the slope between Time 2 and 3 by condition further 
indicated that the confrontation-only slope was marginally more negative than the 
control, b = -4.06, SE = 2.39, p = .09. Although feelings toward women increased from 
Time 1 to 2 in confrontation conditions, they decreased from Time 2 to 3 for the 
confrontation-only condition. Additional analyses indicated that participants in the 
confrontation-only condition had marginally more positive attitudes toward women at 
Time 3 than Time 1, b = 3.92, SE = 2.02, p = .05; thus, the significant increase in feelings 
toward women for participants in the confrontation-only condition from Time 1 to 2 was 
greater in magnitude than the (smaller but significant) decrease in feelings toward women 
from Time 2 to 3.  
For feelings toward feminists from Time 1 to 2, including the effects of condition 
did not significantly improve model fit, ML deviance difference (3) = 4.40, p > .22. The 
simple slopes in Table 8 show that participants in the control condition were marginally 
more negative toward feminists from Time 1 to 2. However, no focused tests for 
condition were significant for the slope between Time 1 and 2, ps > .32. The simple 
slopes also indicated that participants in the confrontation-only condition became more 
positive toward feminists from Time 2 to 3 for the confrontation-only condition. 
However, no focused tests for condition were significant for the slope between Time 2 
and 3, ps > .27. Thus, feelings toward feminists did not improve in the confrontation 
 76 
conditions (vs. control) in the short-term, contrary to Hypothesis 1 and 2, but 
confrontation (vs. no confrontation) increased feelings toward feminists in the long-term. 
For feelings toward party girls from Time 1 to 2, including the effects of 
condition significantly improved model fit, ML deviance difference (3) = 13.50, p < .001. 
The simple slopes in Table 8 show that participants in the control and 
confrontation+elaboration conditions became more negative toward party girls from 
Time 1 to 2. In addition, participants in the confrontation-only condition became 
marginally more positive toward party girls from Time 1 to 2. Focused tests by 
conditions for change between Time 1 and 2 further indicated that the confrontation-only 
slope was significantly more positive than the control, b = 10.27, SE = 3.67, p < 0.01, and 
confrontation+elaboration conditions, b = 10.09, SE = 3.60, p < 0.01, which did not differ 
from each other, p > .95. No simple slopes or condition focused tests were significant for 
the slope between Time 2 and 3, ps > .30. Thus, although feelings toward party girls 
decreased for the control and confrontation+elaboration conditions, feelings toward party 
girls marginally increased for the confrontation-only condition; these differences were 
maintained over time, as there was no significant change from Time 2 to 3. This pattern 
of effects is consistent with Hypothesis 1a, because confrontation (vs. no confrontation) 
caused less negative feelings toward party girls, but inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, 
because elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation messages did not cause less 
negative feelings toward party girls. 
Individual Differences: Gender. Next, I examined whether participant gender 
(i.e., a time invariant, level-2 predictor, with 0 = men, 1 = women) qualified the results of 
condition and/or change over time. Specifically, I added participant gender, gender’s 
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interaction with condition, gender’s interaction with each slope, and the interactions 
between gender, condition, and each slope. These models included only participants with 
complete data in order to be directly comparable. I report significant effects of gender 
from the model including all gender effects in the text, and the resulting main effects are 
specific to Time 2. If the model improved according to ML deviance difference tests 
and/or the effects are significant, the effects were carried forward. Non-significant effects 
of gender are removed from the model one at a time, moving from higher- to lower-order 
effects. Final models for gender are shown in Table 9; if no interactions were significant, 
the main effect in these models represented the effect of gender across time. 
For benevolent sexism, including gender and its interactions did not improve 
model fit, ML deviance difference (9) = 13.90, p > .12. There was a significant main 
effect of gender, b =   -0.46, SE = 0.24, p < .01, which indicated that women endorsed 
benevolent sexism less than men did at Time 2; all other effects of gender ps > .35. 
Because gender remained a significant predictor after nonsignificant higher order 
interactions were removed individually from the model, gender was maintained in the 
model for benevolent sexism, as shown for the final gender model in Table 9.  
For hostile sexism, including gender and its interactions improved model fit, ML 
deviance difference (9) = 24.90, p < .01. There was a significant main effect of gender, b 
= -0.57, SE = 0.29, p < .01, which indicated that women endorsed hostile sexism less than 
men did at Time 2. There also were marginal interactions between gender, condition, and 
change between Time 1 and 2 as well as gender, condition, and change between Time 2 
and 3, ps < .07; all other effects of gender ps > .39. Because gender remained significant 
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after nonsignificant higher order interactions were removed individually from the model, 
the effect of gender was maintained in the model for hostile sexism, as shown in Table 9.  
For feelings toward women, including gender and its interactions did not improve 
model fit, ML deviance difference (9) = 8.60, p > .47. There was a marginal main effect 
of gender, b = 4.24, SE = 4.26, p < .10, which indicated that women had more positive 
feelings toward women than men did at Time 2; all other effects of gender ps > .15. 
Because the effect of gender remained marginal after nonsignificant higher order 
interactions were removed individually from the model, the model for feelings toward 
women did not include the effect of gender.  
For feelings toward feminists, including gender and its interactions improved 
model fit, ML deviance difference (9) = 25.40, p < .01. There was a significant main 
effect of gender, b = 27.32, SE = 6.91, p < .001, which indicated that women had more 
positive feelings toward feminists than men did at Time 2; all other effects of gender ps > 
.12. Because the effect of gender remained significant after nonsignificant higher order 
interactions were removed individually from the model, the effect of gender was kept in 
the model for feelings toward feminists, as shown in Table 9.  
For feelings toward party girls, including gender and its interactions improved 
model fit, ML deviance difference (9) = 17.40, p < .05. There was a significant effect of 
gender, b = -13.73, SE = 7.49, p = .02, which indicated that women had more negative 
feelings toward party girls at Time 2 than men did. There also was a marginal interaction 
between gender and change from Time 1 to 2, b = 9.34, SE = 7.24, p = .09, which 
indicated that women’s feelings toward party girls became more positive from Time 1 to 
2 than did men’s; all other effects of gender ps > .15. Because the interaction between 
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gender and slope12 became significant after nonsignificant higher order interactions were 
removed individually from the model, the effects of gender and the interaction between 
gender and change from Time 1 to 2 were maintained in the model for feelings toward 
party girls. As shown in Table 9 for the final gender model, the main effect of gender 
indicated that women’s feelings toward party girls were 9.47 more negative than were 
men’s feelings at Time 2. The Gender ! Slope12 interaction indicated that men’s feelings 
toward party girls decreased by 13.79 from Time 1 to 2, but women’s feelings toward 
party girls decreased by 5.61 (-13.79 + 8.18) from Time 1 to 2.   
Across these analyses, gender did not qualify the effects of confrontation (vs. no 
confrontation) or elaboration (vs. no elaboration). Instead, gender had a direct effect on 
participant’s intercepts or means at Time 2 for benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, 
feelings toward feminists, and feelings toward party girls. Specifically, men endorsed 
both benevolent and hostile sexism more and had more negative feelings toward 
feminists as well as more positive feelings toward party girls than did women. Participant 
gender also influenced change in feelings toward party girls from Time 1 to 2. Both 
men’s and women’s feelings toward party girls became more negative from Time 1 to 2, 
but the decrease in women’s feelings toward party girls was smaller than was men’s. 
Individual Differences: Need for Cognition. Finally, I investigated how 
individual differences in need for cognition (i.e., a time invariant, level-2 predictor 
measured prior to the manipulation at Time 2) related to change in attitudes and feelings 
toward women and condition, because need for cognition is relevant to Hypothesis 2 
concerning the effect of elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation messages. 
Models were estimated with need for cognition (centered at its midpoint), its interaction 
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with each slope, and its interaction with condition. These models included only 
participants with complete data in order to be directly comparable. If the model improved 
according to ML deviance difference tests and the effects were significant, the effects 
were carried forward. (Non-significant effects were dropped from the model except in the 
case of interactions. If one interaction with a slope was significant, the main effect and 
other slope interaction were retained in the model for interpretability.)  
For benevolent sexism, including the effects of need for cognition did not 
improve model fit, ML deviance difference (5) = 3.10, p > .68. There also were no 
significant effects of need for cognition, p > .15. Thus, the final model did not include 
any effects of need for cognition, as shown in Table 10.  
For hostile sexism, including the effects of need for cognition marginally 
improved model fit, ML deviance difference (5) = 9.60, p = .09. Need for cognition was 
significant, b = -0.33, SE = 0.14, p < .001, which indicated that hostile sexism at Time 2 
decreased by 0.33 for each point above the midpoint on need for cognition. Thus, the 
final model shown in Table 10 included the main effect of need for cognition.  
For feelings toward women, including the effects of need for cognition did not 
improve model fit, ML deviance difference (6) = 6.20, p > .28. However, there was a 
marginal interaction between need for cognition and change from Time 2 to 3, b = 1.96, 
SE = 1.11, p = .08, which indicated that a one point increase in need for cognition makes 
change from Time 2 to 3 marginally more positive. Thus, those higher in need for 
cognition had a marginally greater increase in feelings toward women from Time 2 to 3, 
consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, the interaction between need for cognition and 
change from Time 2 to 3 remained marginal when other nonsignificant effects of need for 
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cognition were removed from the model. Therefore, the final model shown in Table 10 
did not include need for cognition. 
For feelings toward feminists, including the effects of need for cognition 
improved model fit, ML deviance difference (5) = 14.10, p = .01. Although the effect of 
need for cognition was not significant, b = 4.12, SE = 3.39, p > .22, a one point increase 
from the midpoint on need for cognition increased feelings toward feminists by 4.12 at 
Time 2. Although there was not a significant interaction between need for cognition and 
change from Time 1 to 2, b = -0.62, SE = 2.26, p > .78, the interaction was significant for 
change from Time 2 to 3, b = 4.69, SE = 1.96, p = .02. The latter interaction indicated 
that each point above the midpoint on need for cognition increased feelings toward 
feminists from Time 2 to 3 by 4.69, which supports Hypothesis 2. Thus, the final model 
shown in Table 10 included the main effect of need for cognition and its interactions with 
slopes. 
For feelings toward party girls, including the effects of need for cognition 
marginally improved model fit, ML deviance difference (5) = 10.70, p = .06. Need for 
cognition significantly contributed, b = -8.92, SE = 3.84, p < .05, which indicated that a 
one point increase from the midpoint on need for cognition decreased feelings toward 
party girls by 8.92 at Time 2. All other effects of need for cognition were not significant, 
p > .29. Thus, the final model shown in Table 10 included only the main effect of need 
for cognition.  
Summary for Longitudinal Dependent Variables. Analyses indicated that there 
was no significant change from Time 1 to 2 or Time 2 to 3 in benevolent and hostile 
sexism overall or within specific conditions. This finding is contrary to Hypotheses 1a 
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and 2 concerning reductions in sexism from Time 1 to 2. However, feelings toward 
women (but not feminists or party girls) became more positive from Time 1 to 2 for the 
confrontation conditions (vs. control), consistent with Hypothesis 1a. Contrary to 
Hypothesis 2, however, feelings toward women did not become more positive from Time 
1 to 2 for the confrontation+elaboration condition. 
Although participants in the confrontation-only condition became more positive 
toward women from Time 1 to 2, these participants became less positive toward women 
from Time 2 to 3. While this pattern of results suggests a rebound effect whereby feelings 
toward women return to previous levels for participants in the confrontation-only 
condition, the increase in positive feelings toward women from Time 1 to 2 is of larger 
magnitude than the decrease from Time 2 to 3; analyses indicated that participants in this 
condition had marginally more positive attitudes toward women at Time 3 than Time 1. 
Therefore, there are some residual positive effects of confrontation (vs. no confrontation) 
on feelings toward women.  
The pattern for feelings toward feminists was different than that of feelings 
toward women. Participants in the control condition became marginally more negative 
toward feminists from Time 1 to 2, and this marginal decrease in feelings was maintained 
from Time 2 to 3, where there was no significant change. However, participants on the 
confrontation-only condition did not have significant change in feelings toward feminists 
from Time 1 to 2, but these participants’ feelings became less negative toward feminists 
from Time 2 to 3. This “sleeper effect” for confronting sexism (vs. not confronting) on 
feelings toward feminists may be interpreted as support for Hypothesis 1. Specifically, 
participants who observed a confrontation of sexism eventually had more positive 
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attitudes toward feminists than participants who did not observe confrontation. However, 
feelings toward feminists did not change from Time 1 to 2 or Time 2 to 3 for participants 
in the confrontation+elaboration condition, which suggests that elaborating (vs. not 
elaborating) on confrontation messages may have undermined the sleeper effect for the 
confrontation-only condition on feelings toward feminists. 
The pattern across conditions and over time for feelings toward party girls 
differed from that of both feelings toward women and feminists. Although the control and 
confrontation+elaboration condition became more negative from Time 1 to 2, the 
confrontation-only condition became marginally more positive from Time 1 to 2. From 
Time 2 to 3, there were no significant changes in feelings toward party girls for any 
condition, which suggests that this pattern was maintained over time. Again, this pattern 
provides some support for Hypothesis 1a, because confrontation (vs. no confrontation) 
resulted in less negative feelings toward party girls from Time 1 to 2. Overall, the 
patterns of change in feelings toward women, feminists, and party girls provide show that 
confrontation (vs. no confrontation) can reduce negative feelings toward women, which 
is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Further, analyses indicated that the effect of 
confrontation (vs. no confrontation) is not dependent on participant gender. 
Hypothesis 2 concerned the effect of elaboration, and after finding few effects of 
elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation messages on feelings toward women 
over time, I extended this hypothesis to individual differences in need for cognition. The 
analyses examining this factor produced little evidence for the hypothesis that elaborating 
(vs. not elaborating) on confrontation messages reduces prejudice. Contrary to this 
extension of Hypothesis 2, need for cognition did not influence change over time in 
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benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, feelings toward women, or feelings toward party girls. 
However, there was a significant interaction between need for cognition and change over 
time for feelings toward feminists. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, greater need for 
cognition was related to more positive feelings toward feminists from Time 2 to 3.  
Finally, there is no support for Hypothesis 3 concerning longer-lasting attitude 
change for the confrontation+elaboration condition compared to the confrontation-only 
condition. Instead, attitude and feeling change did not depend on the length of time 
between Time 2 and 3. Still, feelings toward women became more positive from Time 1 
to 2 for participants in both confrontation conditions, whereas feelings toward women 
decreased significantly from Time 2 to 3 for participants in the confrontation-only 
condition but not the confrontation+elaboration condition. This finding suggests that 
elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation messages may help maintain the 
increase in attitudes toward women seen from Time 1 to 2 at Time 3.  
However, examining the cumulative effects as well as the magnitude of change 
over time suggests that participants in both confrontation conditions have a similar 
increase in feelings toward women from Time 1 to 3. Additional analyses support this 
proposition, because change from Time 1 to 3 was not different between confrontation 
conditions, b = -2.14, SE = 2.51, p > .39. That is, participants in the confrontation-only 
condition increased feelings toward women from Time 1 to 2 but slightly decreased from 
Time 2 to 3; still, there was a net increase in feelings toward women for participants in 
the confrontation-only condition from Time 1 to 3. Participants in the 
confrontation+elaboration condition, on the other hand, increased in feelings toward 
women from Time 1 to 2, but there is no significantly change from Time 2 to 3. Thus, the 
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cumulative effects of these changes from Time 1 to 3 are similar for both confrontation 





 Although previous research has shown that confrontation reduces prejudice and 
discrimination (e.g., Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Czopp et al., 2006; Hillard & Ryan, 2011; 
Mallet & Wagner, 2011), the effect of speaking up about prejudice has rarely been 
examined over time. In addition, the processes underlying the prejudice-reducing effects 
of confrontation on perpetrators and observers are not known. The purpose of the present 
study was to fill these gaps in the literature by examining whether confronting prejudice 
(vs. not confronting) reduces prejudice in observers over time as well as whether 
elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation messages further reduces prejudice. 
Based on an integration of the confronting prejudice and persuasion theory literatures, I 
developed and tested three hypotheses about the effects of confrontation and elaboration 
on observers’ attitudes and behavior in the short- and longer-term. Hypothesis 1 
concerned the effect of confronting (vs. not confronting) prejudice; I expected that 
confronting would decrease sexism in the short-term and discrimination in the longer-
term. Hypothesis 2 concerned the effect of elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on 
confrontation messages; I expected that elaborating on confrontation messages would 
decrease sexism and discrimination more than confrontation alone. Hypothesis 3 
concerned the effect of elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation messages over 
time; I expected participants who elaborated on confrontation messages to maintain the 
reduction in prejudice over a longer period of time than participants who did not 
elaborate on confrontation messages. 
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To test these hypotheses, college students who had completed pretest measures of 
attitudes and feelings towards women (i.e., Time 1) were exposed to sexist jokes, which 
can cause discrimination (Ford et al., 2008). I manipulated whether a speaker either 
negatively evaluated the jokes or confronted prejudice in the jokes; I also manipulated 
whether participants wrote a control essay or an essay elaborating on the confrontation 
message. Thus, 361 participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 
control (i.e., no confrontation with control essay), a confrontation without elaboration 
(i.e., confrontation with control essay), or a confrontation with elaboration (i.e., 
confrontation with elaboration essay). Participants then completed the same measures of 
attitudes and feelings towards women immediately after the confrontation message (i.e., 
Time 2) and after a 1-14 day delay through an ostensibly unrelated study (i.e., Time 3).  
My hypotheses and the results of the analyses that tested them are summarized in the 
sections that follow. 
Hypothesis 1: The Effect of Confrontation (vs. No Confrontation) 
 Based on previous research, I expected confronting sexism to cause less hostile 
attitudes toward women in the short-term (Hypothesis 1a) and less discrimination in the 
longer-term (Hypothesis 1b) in observers than not confronting sexism. There was some 
evidence to support this hypothesis. Specifically, longitudinal analyses indicated that 
participants’ feelings toward women in the confrontation conditions became more 
positive from Time 1 to 2, whereas there was no change in feelings toward women for 
participants in the control condition. Participants in the control condition, though, became 
more negative toward party girls from Time 1 to 2, whereas participants in the 
confrontation-only condition became marginally more positive toward party girls from 
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Time 1 to 2. These findings support Hypothesis 1a, because feelings toward women and 
party girls increased from Time 1 to 2 for participants in the confrontation-only condition 
but not for participants in the control condition. In addition, these effects of confrontation 
(vs. no confrontation) were not dependent on participant gender. However, contrary to 
Hypothesis 1a, there were no significant changes from Time 1 to 2 in benevolent sexism, 
hostile sexism, or feelings toward feminists for any condition.  
 Although early research on confronting prejudice focused mostly on perpetrators’ 
affective responses to confronting prejudice (e.g., Czopp & Monteith, 2003), one study 
indicated that confronting perpetrators can reduce racism (Czopp et al., 2006). However, 
I did not find that observing a confrontation (vs. no confrontation) of sexist jokes reduced 
sexism. The present study differs from Czopp et al.’s in two important ways. The present 
study examined observer outcomes of confronting sexism, whereas Czopp et al. 
examined perpetrator outcomes of being confronted about racism. However, other 
findings were more parallel across these studies. Czopp et al. examined prejudice 
reduction through ratings of racist jokes. They found that confrontation (vs. no 
confrontation) did not decrease participants’ ratings of racist jokes. Similarly, I did not 
find that confrontation (vs. no confrontation) reduces liking of sexist jokes. 
 More broadly, though, I found that confrontation (vs. no confrontation) influenced 
feelings toward women but not the endorsement of sexism itself. Prejudice, like other 
attitudes, involves three interrelated components—affect, behavior, and cognition. 
Previous research on confronting prejudice has examined overall racism as well as 
stereotypic behavior and beliefs, which addresses behavioral and cognitive components 
of prejudice (Czopp et al., 2006). The present study shows that the affective component 
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of prejudice (i.e., negative evaluations) can also be reduced through confronting (vs. not 
confronting) prejudice. It also examined discriminatory behavior, which I turn to next. 
Participants in the control and confrontation-only conditions donated similar 
amounts to a women’s organization immediately following the manipulations. However, 
1-14 days following the manipulations, participants in the control condition discriminated 
against women more than participants in the confrontation-only condition. This finding 
provides full support for Hypothesis 1b, because observing a confrontation of sexism 
decreased discrimination against women in the long-term compared to not observing a 
confrontation of sexism. 
Past research on the behavioral effects of confrontation indicated that confronted 
(vs. not confronted) perpetrators stereotyped less (Czopp et al., 2006) and used less 
biased language (Mallet & Wagner, 2011). The only behavioral measures of 
confrontation for observers rather than perpetrators of prejudice indicated that people 
who were likely to have observed confrontations of prejudice were more likely to sign an 
anti-prejudice petition (Paluck, 2011). The present research extends this research by 
showing observers of a confrontation of sexist jokes were less discriminatory towards 
women than observers of sexist jokes that were not confronted.  
Further, the measure of discrimination in the present study occurred 1-14 days 
after the confrontation, which addresses an important limitation of previous research on 
confronting prejudice. That is, nearly all research on confronting prejudice as well as 
most research on prejudice reduction (e.g., Paluck, 2006; Paluck & Green, 2009) 
examines attitude change only in the immediate context of the laboratory and rarely 
examines behavioral outcomes. This study examines behavior over time as well as 
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beyond the laboratory and shows that confrontation (vs. no confrontation) decreases 
discrimination in a more real-world context and on an ecologically valid task of 
distributing budget cuts. 
Hypothesis 2: The Effect of Elaborating (vs. Not Elaborating) on Confrontation 
Messages  
Because elaboration on high quality messages can increase persuasion, I expected 
elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation messages to cause less hostile attitudes 
toward women in the short-term (Hypothesis 2a) and less discrimination in the long-term 
(Hypothesis 2b) in observers. There was only limited support for this hypothesis. 
Compared to participants in the control condition, participants in the 
confrontation+elaboration condition donated more to a women’s organization. However, 
there was no significant difference between the amounts donated for participants the 
confrontation-only and confrontation+elaboration conditions; instead, it appears to be the 
combined effects of confrontation and elaboration that increased donation rather than the 
effect of elaboration alone, which is contrary to Hypothesis 2.  
Participants in the confrontation conditions discriminated less against women than 
participants in the control condition 1-14 days following the manipulations. Again, 
however, there was no significant difference between the budget cut amount from a 
women’s organization for participants in the confrontation-only and 
confrontation+elaboration conditions. This finding is contrary to Hypothesis 2b, because 
elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation messages did not cause less 
discrimination in the long-term. 
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In addition, longitudinal analyses did not support Hypothesis 2a, because there 
was not greater attitude or feeling change from Time 1 to 2 for participants in the 
confrontation+elaboration condition than participants in the confrontation-only condition. 
In fact, feelings toward party girls became more negative from Time 1 to 2 for 
participants in the confrontation+elaboration condition, whereas feelings toward party 
girls became more positive from Time 1 to 2 for participants in the confrontation-only 
condition. Further, these differences were maintained over time, as there was no 
significant change for either condition from Time 2 to 3. 
Because I found few effects of elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation 
messages, I extended Hypothesis 2 to examine whether individual differences in general 
tendencies to elaborate or effortfully process messages (i.e., need for cognition) 
decreased prejudice and discrimination. However, need for cognition did not predict 
donation at Time 2 or budget discrimination at Time 3 and did not interact with 
condition. I also examined whether need for cognition influenced change in attitudes and 
feelings toward women from Time 1 to 2. Although need for cognition did not influence 
change across time points for benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, feelings toward women, 
and feelings toward party girls, need for cognition did influence change in feelings 
toward feminists from Time 2 to 3. Specifically, participants with higher need for 
cognition showed a greater increase in attitudes toward feminists from Time 2 to 3. 
Because feminists may be perceived as more likely to confront sexism, this finding 
suggests that a tendency toward elaboration may make feelings toward confronters more 
positive in the long-term. 
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Overall, there was little support for the hypothesis that elaborating (vs. not 
elaborating) on confrontation messages enhances confrontation’s effect. Manipulation 
check items indicated that participants in the confrontation+elaboration condition 
perceived paying more attention to sexist jokes and were more certain of their attitudes 
toward them than participants in the confrontation-only condition. This finding suggests 
that elaborating on confrontation messages was achieved in this study; however, other 
comparisons between the confrontation conditions indicated that elaborating on 
confrontation messages is not the primary mechanism through which confrontation has 
its prejudice-reducing effect.  
Hypothesis 3: Length of Effects Over Time  
I hypothesized that attitude change would last longer for participants in the 
confrontation+elaboration condition compared to the confrontation-only condition. 
Although I had planned to examine how long these the effects lasted over time as a 
function of the number of days between Time 2 and 3, initial unconditional models 
indicated that real time did not moderate participants’ change over time. Instead, I used a 
more parsimonious treatment of time (i.e., as occasion of measurement 1, 2, and 3) that 
did not lose information compared to a less parsimonious treatment of time (i.e., real time 
in days between Time 2 and 3). This finding suggests that the effects of confrontation (vs. 
no confrontation) and/or elaboration (vs. no elaboration) of confrontation messages may 
not decay significantly, or at least not on a daily basis. In terms of Hypothesis 3, there is 
no support because the amount of time that passed between Time 2 and 3 did not 
influence attitudes or feelings. Thus, the effects of confrontation (vs. no confrontation) 
and elaboration (vs. no elaboration) of confrontation messages found in the present study 
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are maintained at post-test regardless of the amount of time that has passed, at least for 
the range of time (i.e., 1-14 days) examined in this study. 
Overall, confrontation (vs. no confrontation) reduced prejudice and 
discrimination; however, elaborating on confrontation messages did not further reduce 
prejudice and discrimination compared to confrontation alone. Thus, there was evidence 
to support Hypothesis 1 but little evidence to support for Hypothesis 2. Because the 
number of days between Time 2 and 3 did not moderate the change from Time 2 to 3, 
there was no evidence to support Hypothesis 3 that elaborating on confrontation 
messages lasts longer than confrontation without elaboration. Although persuasion 
theories may provide a framework to examine the various outcomes of confronting 
prejudice, the present study indicates that confronting prejudice may in some ways differ 
from other attempts at persuasion that are influenced by elaboration. This study indicates 
that simply breaking the perceived consensus that exists after sexist jokes reduces 
prejudice and discrimination, regardless of elaboration of confrontation messages. 
Findings Beyond Hypotheses: Affect and Confronter Evaluation 
Outside of the specific hypotheses, this study replicates and extends some 
previous research on confronting prejudice. For example, past research had shown that 
perpetrators experience negative affect after being confronted (vs. not confronted; Czopp 
et al., 2006). The present study indicates that observers of confrontation who elaborate on 
confrontation messages experience more discomfort and negative affect than observers of 
a confrontation who do not engage in elaboration. According to the Self-Regulation of 
Prejudice Model (Monteith & Mark, 2005), discomfort and/or negative affect may lead to 
the development of cues for self-regulation, which prevents future prejudice. Thus, the 
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present study extends previous research on the affective outcomes of confrontation by 
showing that observers who elaborate (vs. do not elaborate) on confrontation also 
experience discomfort and negative affect, which may help these observers avoid future 
prejudice. 
This study also examined the evaluations of confronters. Previous research 
indicated that confronters are sometimes evaluated negatively (e.g., Dodd et al, 2001; 
Kaiser & Miller, 2001). However, other research indicated that men do not more 
negatively evaluate a confronter following confrontations about sexism or sexual 
harassment (vs. no confrontation control; Mallet & Wagner, 2011; Saunders & Senn, 
2009). In the present study, there were no differences between men’s evaluations of a 
woman who either confronted sexism or negatively evaluated the jokes without mention 
of sexism. This finding supports previous research indicating that confronters of sexism 
may not be evaluated negatively by confrontation recipients (e.g., Mallet & Wagner, 
2011; Saunders & Senn, 2009). However, women more positively evaluated a woman 
who confronted prejudice (vs. negatively evaluated the jokes). Thus, the present study 
replicates research on men’s evaluations of confronters of sexism but also extends this 
research by indicating that women positively evaluate confronters of sexism. Therefore, 
targets of prejudice may evaluate confronters more positively. As such, the present 
research adds to a growing literature indicating that confronting prejudice may not always 
be costly to confronters (see also Gervais & Hillard, 2011). 
Limitations 
As in any study, there are limitations that may affect the internal and external 
validity of the results. The manipulation of elaboration in this study is new; recent 
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research on prejudice reduction has manipulated elaboration differently. For example, 
Husnu and Crips (2010) asked participants to imagine that they engaged in conversation 
with an outgroup member and learned something interesting about him/her. Elaboration 
in this work was manipulated by asking participants in the high elaboration condition to 
imagine when and where intergroup contact might occur, whereas participants in the low 
elaboration condition did not receive this additional instruction. This manipulation of 
elaboration aimed to increase the vividness of the imagined contact, which was expected 
to make the scenario more accessible in memory. After the imagined contact, participants 
reported how willing they were to engage in future intergroup contact. The results of this 
work indicate that participants who had more (vs. less) detailed imagined contact have 
stronger intentions to engage in intergroup interaction.  
In the present study, participants were similarly asked to imagine observing an 
exchange of sexist jokes between co-workers. Participants in the 
confrontation+elaboration condition then wrote an essay describing the reasons that sexist 
jokes might be considered offensive. Behavioral intentions were also measured in the 
present study; however, neither elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation 
messages nor confrontation itself (vs. control) influenced intentions regarding the use or 
confronting of sexism. On the other hand, it is also possible that elaboration did not affect 
intentions in the present study because participants were not asked to imagine using 
sexist language or confronting sexist language, which would have been more parallel to 
Husnu and Crisp (2010). 
Second, the effects of elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation messages 
were limited. It is possible that the essay manipulation was simply ineffective; it is thus 
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far unclear whether participants’ essays reflect elaboration of confrontation messages. 
However, manipulation checks indicated that participants in the 
confrontation+elaboration condition reported thinking more about the jokes than did 
participants in the confrontation-only and control conditions. Participants in the 
confrontation+elaboration condition also felt more confident about their opinions of the 
jokes, which is consistent with HSM’s sufficiency threshold (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
These participants had the ability (and to varying degrees, motivation) to conduct high 
effort processing until they had a high level of confidence in their attitude.  
An additional issue related to internal validity of the experiment concerns the 
repeated measures design. Participants completed highly similar measures at three time 
points; seeing similar measures at Time 3 may have cued participants to the real purpose 
of the supposedly unrelated study. However, behavioral measures (i.e., the budget cut 
task) were completed prior to the measures included at all time points, and confrontation 
(vs. no confrontation) influenced behavioral measures as well as longitudinal measures 
completed across time points.  
Other potential limitations concern the generalization of the present findings 
across situations and people. In the present study, sexist jokes were confronted because 
previous research indicated that jokes, but not statements, serve as a releaser for prejudice 
(Ford et al., 2008). Specifically, hostile sexist men exposed to a sexist joke—but not a 
sexist statement—donated less to a women’s organization and cut more of the budget for 
a women’s organization. The goal of the present study was to examine whether 
confrontation with or without elaboration might overcome the effect of sexist jokes in the 
short- and long-term. The control condition in the present study was parallel to Ford et 
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al.’s sexist joke condition, but I found that confrontation buffered the negative effects of 
sexist humor. Specifically, participants in the confrontation+elaboration condition 
donated more to a women’s organization than did participants in the control condition. 
Further, participants in both confrontation conditions cut less from a women’s 
organization 1-14 days later. While sexist jokes but not statements served as a releaser for 
prejudice (Ford et al.), it remains unclear whether overtly prejudiced statements or 
behaviors (vs. jokes) cause later discrimination that confronting prejudice might buffer.  
It is also not clear whether the effect of confrontation would apply to other types 
of prejudice. According to past research, confronting racism is more effective than 
confronting sexism (Czopp & Montieth, 2003). Because the present study found that 
confronting (vs. not confronting) sexism reduced discrimination and increased positive 
feelings toward women, it is likely that confronting racism similarly reduces 
discrimination and increases feelings toward ethnic minorities in the long-term. In 
addition, confronting casual anti-gay statements (e.g., “That’s so gay”) has been shown to 
reduce prejudice (Hillard & Ryan, 2011). As such, I expect the short- and long-term 
effects of confronting (vs. not confronting) sexism found in the present study to 
generalize to other –isms; again, however, the present study does not address this 
question. 
The present study also examined the effect of imagined rather than real 
confrontation. That is, participants in this study imagined witnessing a confrontation 
rather than actually witnessing an in vivo confrontation. The extent to which the results of 
these types of lab manipulations generalize to real-world behavior is not clear; certainly, 
there are reasons to be concerned. Consider, for example, that people overestimate how 
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emotionally disturbed they would be by prejudiced behavior (Kawakami et al., 2009) as 
well as their likelihood to confront prejudiced behavior (Swim & Hyers, 1999) in 
imagined versus in vivo scenarios. Such findings suggest that actually experiencing an 
event has different effects than imagining an event. However, an imagined event’s 
influence could be underestimated in comparison to actual experience. As such, 
overhearing a confrontation in vivo could reduce prejudice more than imagining this 
scenario. For example, demand characteristics and social desirability may be less 
influential when the confrontation is real rather than imagined. One then might argue that 
the present study presents a stricter test of my hypotheses. That is, if imagining observing 
a confrontation (vs. no confrontation) has reduces prejudice and discrimination, as the 
present indicates, I would expect that actually witnessing that confrontation would reduce 
prejudice and discrimination to a greater degree. 
Note also that in the present study, participants observed confrontation; they were 
not perpetrators of sexism who were confronted. However, I expect the effect of being 
the recipient of the confrontation as a perpetrator would be greater than observing a 
confrontation of a perpetrator. Again, the present study presents a stricter test of my 
hypotheses. If observing a confrontation (vs. no confrontation) reduces prejudice and 
discrimination, as found in this study, I would expect that being personally confronted 
would have a greater effect on prejudice and discrimination. On the other hand, 
personally being confronted may cause stronger emotional reaction (e.g., Czopp et al., 
2006), including more negative emotion and increased defensiveness, which may 
undermine prejudice reduction. However, the present study does not address this 
question. 
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 Finally, it remains unclear whether the present findings generalize to other 
populations. Participants in the present study were a convenience sample of college 
students enrolled in psychology courses, which is typically and problematically the case 
in most social psychological research (e.g., Smart, 1966). College students are relatively 
homogenous on two particularly influential variables—age and educational level. Thus, 
for example, it is possible that the pattern of results would differ for older participants. 
College students’ attitudes may be more malleable than older populations (Sears, 1986). 
Adolescents and young adults are likely to be developing their identities, which may 
cause their attitudes and beliefs to be less defined than are attitudes among an older 
population. Adolescents and young adults may also be more susceptible to social 
influence and peer pressure, which is a particular problem for the present research. On the 
other hand, college students often have more liberal attitudes on social issues (Nagourney 
& Thee, 2007), including more egalitarian attitudes about gender (e.g., Beere, King, 
Beere, & King, 1984), than the general public. As such, a college sample may present a 
stricter test of hypotheses related to prejudice. The present study’s results may be 
conservative estimates of actual prejudice reduction following confrontation, because a 
college sample has lower prejudice than the general population prior to any 
confrontation.  
Implications 
 Nevertheless, the present study has both theoretical and practical implications. 
This study examined whether elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation messages 
increases confrontation’s effect. I found little consistent evidence that elaborating on 
confrontation decreased prejudice and discrimination relative to confrontation alone. As 
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discussed above, it is possible that a different manipulation of elaboration may be more 
effective, but it does not appear that elaborating on the message is necessary for 
confrontation to influence feelings and behaviors toward social groups.  
 The present study addresses an alternate explanation or confound of all prior 
research on the outcomes of confronting prejudice—demand characteristics. 
Experimental demand effects occur when participants are cued to what response is 
expected or “demanded” of them in the experiment. The cues that participants receive 
and/or the interpretations that participants make are most problematic when those cues or 
interpretations are parallel to the true purpose of the study. For example, participants who 
are aware of the true purpose of the study may be more likely to respond in a way that is 
consistent expectations. Across studies of confronting, the finding that participants’ 
attitudes appear more positive in experimental conditions than in control conditions 
might lead one to conclude that demand characteristics were largely responsible for the 
pattern of effects obtained. That is, the confrontation condition is more transparent than 
the control condition in terms of the participants being aware of the purpose of study, 
which may cause participants to conform to the study’s purpose.  
However, the present research indicates that the effect of confrontation (vs. no 
confrontation) lasted outside of the laboratory on a behavioral measure of discrimination 
that occurred 1-14 days later. There are several ways in which this finding challenges 
experimental demand interpretations of the effects of confrontation (vs. no 
confrontation). First, the long-term measure of discrimination occurred ostensibly in the 
context of a different study. In fact, steps were taken to maximize the degree to which the 
studies appeared unconnected. Time 2 occurred in the laboratory and in exchange for 
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partial course credit, whereas Time 3 occurred online and in exchange for cash payment. 
In addition, different experimenter names were provided on the consent forms, which 
also had different explanations for the purpose of the study (i.e., Time 2, perceptions of 
interactions; Time 3, distribution of budget cuts on campus). Differentiating the two 
studies minimizes demand explanations because any cues or interpretations the 
participants received and made at Time 2 should not carry through to the “unrelated” 
Time 3. Second, behavioral intentions are more influenced by experimental demand than 
actual behavior. In the present study, discrimination was measured through behavior 
rather than intentions. Third, Time 3 occurred 1-14 days later, which likely further 
differentiated the phases of the study but also decreased the likelihood that participants 
would remember and apply and cues or interpretations they made at Time 2 to Time 3. In 
addition, they may have completed other studies during the same time frame to further 
dilute any cues or interpretations. Thus, the reduced discrimination as a result of 
confrontation (vs. no confrontation) does not appear to be limited to the immediate 
context of the laboratory or due purely to demand characteristics.  
 Practically, this study suggests how people might approach confronting prejudice 
in their everyday lives. According to most outcomes examined in this study, one needs to 
simply break the perceived consensus that occurs after a sexist joke in order to buffer 
prejudice and discrimination that might otherwise be the result of the joke. Thus, the 
present study as well as others (e.g., Czopp et al., 2006) indicates that confrontation 
reduces prejudice. Although certain messages may be more or less effective at 
accomplishing this goal, my review of the literature indicates that confrontation message 
hostility generally affects confrontation recipients’ emotional reaction and evaluations of 
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confronters but not attitude or behavior change. Thus, it is possible that any confrontation 
may reduce prejudice and discrimination regardless of its message. Instead, message 
variables such as hostility may influence more peripheral outcomes of confrontation (e.g., 
affect and evaluation of confronters) instead of the main goal of confronting prejudice 
(i.e., attitude/behavior change; Hyers, 2007). 
Future Research 
 The data collected in the present study can be examined to consider additional 
questions related to the effect of confrontation on prejudice and discrimination across 
time. For example, I included measures of feelings toward men and can thus examine 
how attitudes toward men might vary over time and condition. Also, I measured 
individual differences in internal and external motivation to respond without sexism, 
gender activism, and need for affect. It will be interesting to examine whether the effect 
of confrontation is larger in the short-term for those with high external motivation to 
respond without sexism but later disappears when the social pressure is no longer being 
applied. I would expect that people with internal motivation to respond without sexism 
and/or people who have greater gender activism to have less prejudice and to show less 
discriminatory behavior, which may mean that confrontation (vs. no confrontation) does 
not have a dramatic effect on these groups. I also will be able to examine whether 
tendencies to approach or avoid emotion relates to outcomes of confrontation, which 
related to the theoretical explanation of a barrier to confronting (Aboud & Joong, 2007). 
 I also plan to further examine how self-regulation may play a role in the outcomes 
of confronting prejudice. According to the Self-Regulation of Prejudice Model (Monteith 
& Mark, 2005), negative affect and guilt cause people to develop cues for control of 
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prejudice. In the present study, I did not find that confrontation (vs. no confrontation) or 
elaboration (vs. no elaboration) of confrontation messages influenced participants’ guilt, 
but I did find that participants in the confrontation+elaboration condition experienced 
more negative affect than participants in the confrontation-only condition. Further, at 
Time 3, men perceived less local agreement with their cuts to a women’s organization in 
both confrontation conditions relative to the control. Men’s shift in perceived local norms 
at Time 3 as an effect of confrontation (vs. no confrontation) may be related to their 
emotional experiences at Time 2. Thus, I plan to examine how Time 2 post-confrontation 
affect might relate to reductions in prejudice and discrimination as well as perceptions of 
social norms at Time 3. 
 I also plan to use mixed method analyses (i.e., quantitative + qualitative) to 
examine the effect of elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation messages on later 
attitudes and behavior. I plan to code the essays participants provided to gain an 
understanding of why participants may or may not have found sexist jokes offensive. 
Qualitative themes emerging from this analysis may warrant further examination of the 
quantitative outcomes of the study based on those themes. Specific themes within 
participants’ essays may be associated with study outcomes (e.g., Hillard, Ryan, & 
Gervais, 2011). For example, perhaps some participants developed arguments about why 
sexist jokes were offensive that later were related to reduced prejudice compared to other 
arguments. Alternatively, the absolute number of arguments that participants generated 
rather than kind of arguments might influence reductions in prejudice and discrimination. 
Finding, for example, that more arguments for why sexist jokes are offensive caused 
greater attitude change would provide some support for Hypothesis 2 (i.e., that 
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elaborating on confrontation messages causes less prejudice and discrimination than 
confrontation alone).  
 Finally, because I found little change over time and no effects of confrontation 
(vs. no confrontation) or elaboration (vs. no elaboration) of confrontation messages for 
benevolent and hostile sexism, I can examine underlying assumptions of ambivalent 
sexism. First, I can control for condition and examine this data for test-retest reliability of 
a frequently used measure, the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory. Second, I can re-examine 
whether benevolent and hostile sexists have polarized feelings toward subtypes of women 
(i.e., a replication of Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997). For example, 
benevolent sexists have positive attitudes toward women – especially traditional women 
(e.g., homemakers). On the other hand, hostile sexists have negative attitudes toward 
women – especially non-traditional women (e.g., career women and feminists). Because I 
included feeling thermometers for women in general as well as specific subtypes of 
women, I can use this data to examine whether these classic findings of ambivalent 
sexism still hold nearly 15 years after the original work. 
 Future research outside of the data collected as part of the present study may 
provide additional support of the effects of confrontation. In the introduction, I argued 
that some contradictory findings regarding the source of the confrontation might be 
explained by dual process theories of persuasion. This argument was the basis for the 
present study, which examined whether elaborating (vs. not elaborating) on confrontation 
messages increases the effects of confrontation in the short- and/or long-term. However, a 
different study could be designed to directly examine the effects of confronting prejudice 
using a persuasion paradigm. Consistent with the general approach to research on the 
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dual processes of persuasion, this study would manipulate argument quality and either 
ability or motivation to process the confrontation message. For example, participants 
might be exposed to strong or weak confrontation message under conditions of high or 
low cognitive load, which would limit participants’ ability to process the message. If 
confrontation is similar to any other attempt at persuasion, participants under high 
cognitive load will be equally persuaded by a strong or weak confrontation message; 
however, participants under low cognitive load will be more persuaded by a strong than 
weak confrontation message. On the other hand, if confrontation has its effect on 
attitudes and behavior by simply breaking the perceived consensus or increasing 
perceptions of egalitarian social norms, weak confrontation messages may still be 
persuasive for participants under low cognitive load.  
There are two reasons why confrontation might prove to differ from other 
persuasive attempts through future research. First, the present study did not show 
consistent enhancement of confrontation through elaboration on confrontation messages. 
Second, similar effects of confrontation have been shown for fairly weak confrontation 
arguments (e.g., Hillard & Ryan, 2011). Thus, although persuasion theories provide a 
framework to examine the effects of confronting, additional research is necessary to 
examine whether confronting prejudice can be see like any other persuasive attempt. 
Future research also should continue to examine prejudice reduction strategies 
through ecologically valid means. There is a clear need for experimental field research to 
understand the best approaches for prejudice reduction (Paluck & Green, 2009). As 
mentioned in the introduction, there are a variety of approaches to prejudice reduction 
that have not been widely examined by social scientists (e.g., diversity education; Paluck, 
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2006). These approaches provide the opportunity to examine the effects of everyday 
interventions to reduce prejudice, and various means of reducing prejudice—including 
confronting prejudice—might be effectively examined in this context.   
Conclusion 
 This study replicates and extends previous research indicating that confronting 
prejudice effectively reduces prejudice and discrimination in observers compared to not 
confronting prejudice. Further, these effects were shown over three time points and 
multiple measures of feelings and behavior toward women. The present study shows that 
the effect of confrontation (vs. no confrontation) is not limited to lab manipulations and 
does not have limited duration. As such, people can have a lasting impact on others’ 
prejudice and discrimination through the simple act of speaking up about prejudice. 
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Footnotes 
 1 There were three scenarios in Czopp & Monteith (2003) in which one argument 
was made per confrontation. In scenario 1, the confrontation was: “I think that’s racially 
(gender) biased, maybe we could have a Black (female) surgeon.” In scenario 2, the 
confrontation was: “Do you know that you just called Dr. Osgood ‘Mr. (Mrs.)’ but you 
called Dr. Johnson ‘Dr.’ … which shows some racial (gender) bias.” In scenario 3, the 
confrontation was: “I really don’t think people should tell or laugh at jokes that play on 
stereotypes.” 
 2 The confrontation in Czopp et al.’s (2006) Study 2 was: “I thought you typed 
pretty fast, but I noticed that for some of the pictures of Black people you said some 
stereotypical things like criminal, bum, and welfare. I mean, I guess that fits, but maybe 
that’s being a little biased. Don’t you think we should really try to treat everyone 
equally?” This confrontation was moderately hostile and makes two arguments; one 
regarded the prejudice, and one appealed to egalitarianism. Compared to the arguments in 
Czopp & Monteith (2003), the egalitarian appeal seems to be a stronger argument. 
 3 The low hostility confrontation was: “But maybe it would be good to think about 
Blacks in other ways that are a little more fair? It seems that a lot of times Blacks don’t 
get equal treatment in our society, you know what I mean?” The high hostility 
confrontation was: “But you should really try to think about Blacks in other ways that are 
less prejudiced. It just seems that you sound like some kind of a racist to me. You know 
what I mean?” 
4 Another possibility that was considered is a distraction paradigm. That is, a 
divided attention task was considered that would inhibit participants’ ability to process a 
verbal message that elaborated on the confrontation. In this type of task, participants 
visually monitor a string of numbers presented every one (for high distraction) or five 
(for low distraction) seconds while listening to the message and press a key when the 
target number was presented on the screen.   
Unfortunately, distraction from a persuasive message is murkier than it may seem 
for four reasons. First, there are four levels of message involvement (i.e., pre-attention, 
focal attention, comprehension, and elaboration; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and distraction 
addresses message attention or comprehension rather than elaboration. Thus, a distraction 
manipulation follows from message-learning paradigm, and the problems inherent in that 
paradigm were already discussed. Dual process theories, on the other hand, focus on 
elaboration. Elaboration involves developing one’s own arguments, which is at a deeper 
level of understanding than comprehension.  
Second, research shows that there must be a large decline in comprehension to 
decrease attitude change (Buller & Hall, 1998). Thus, the outcome of a distraction 
manipulation would be that one group pays attention to an additional message while the 
distracted group does not. The manipulation then actually compares the number of 
arguments. My research already shows that there is no difference in participants’ (N = 
145) attitude change between a 30-second public service announcement (PSA) showing a 
confrontation of “that’s so gay” and a five-minute speech featuring the PSA (Hillard & 
Ryan, 2011).  
 Third, there are conflicting findings regarding distraction’s effect on persuasion. 
In some studies, distraction decreases persuasion, which may be caused by decreased 
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message comprehension. However, in other studies, distraction increases persuasion, 
which may be caused by decreased counter arguing (Perloff, 2003). The distraction 
hypothesis indicates that distraction increases persuasion by blocking cognitive responses 
to the message. In this case, people are distracted not from the message but from counter-
arguing the message. A meta-analysis suggests that whether the distraction is 
communication-relevant or communication-irrelevant is a feature of distraction that 
influences the outcome (Buller & Hall, 1998). The previously mentioned distraction task 
would be classified as a communication-irrelevant distraction. However:  
“communication-irrelevant distractions merely divert the receiver’s attention 
away from the persuasive appeal with unpredictable results. [Emphasis in the 
original.] They can produce a sustained disruption and lower comprehension, 
reducing persuasion or represent a temporary, albeit annoying, diversion with 
little effect on persuasion.” (Buller & Hall, pg. 162) 
In addition, three studies that reported decreased message comprehension also found 
increased attitude change. Thus, even if one is able to address comprehension rather than 
counter-arguing, the effect of distraction may have the opposite of the desired effect.  
 Fourth, there is one more way in which distraction manipulations are unstable. 
The distraction hypothesis posits that distraction decreases counter-argument; however, 
other research suggests that it blocks the dominant cognitive response to the message, 
whether that be counter-arguing or arguments in support of the message. For example, 
egalitarian people should generate supportive thoughts regarding the confrontation 
message, whereas less egalitarian people should counter-argue. If the dominant cognitive 
response is dampened by distraction, egalitarian people should be less persuaded by a 
confrontation message, whereas less egalitarian people should be more persuaded by a 
confrontation message. Therefore, the effect of the distraction task would depend on 
individual differences in prejudice. 
 In short, there are four problems with a distraction task: (1) distraction may 
interfere with comprehension rather than elaboration; (2) distraction would compare the 
number of arguments; (3) message-irrelevant distraction can have unpredictable results; 
and (4) distraction may have conflicting results based on individual differences. To avoid 
these problems, I selected an essay manipulation. An essay manipulation required one 
group to elaborate – using their own arguments—on why the sexist jokes may be 
offensive to someone. In order to increase the strength of the manipulation, the control 
essay described a mundane task in detail unrelated to the confrontation. This control 
essay prevented any further elaboration of the confrontation message, whereas the essay 




Participants’ guilt as a function of confronter’s target status and argument strength 
 Weak argument Strong argument 
Target confronter Less guilt More guilt 




Measures Participants Completed by Time 





Motivation to control sexism !    
Gender activism !  !  
Need for cognition  !   
Need for affect  !   
Social desirability  !   
Feeling thermometers !  ! ! 
Ambivalent sexism !  ! ! 
Affect   !  
Ratings of scenario, jokes, and 
speakers 
  !  
Behavioral intentions   !  
Perceived processing and 
attitude certainty 
  !  
Donation   !  
Budget cut discrimination    ! 
Budget cut norms    ! 











































1.99ab (1.24) 1.71a (1.13) 2.06b (1.14) 
Discomfort* 2.12a (1.05) 1.81b (0.78) 2.07a (0.82) 
Note. Means with different superscripts within rows significantly differ, p < .05. 
* p < .05, + p < .10.  
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Table 4 
Liking of Jokes by Joke Type and Participant Gender, M(SD) 
 Neutral jokes Sexist jokes 




   Men       (n = 144) 4.53 (1.33) 4.61b (1.47) 
   Total      (N = 356) 4.20 (1.36) 3.70 (1.63) 















   Men       (n = 145) 4.39 (1.32) 4.28 (1.48) 4.47 (1.45) 
Note. Means with different superscripts within rows significantly differ, p < .01. 
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Table 6 





Local Norms*    






   Men 4.50 (1.79) 3.42 (1.31) 3.67 (1.46) 
General Norms    
   Women 4.39 (1.33) 4.10 (1.26) 4.21 (1.40) 
   Men 3.90 (1.17) 3.68 (1.29) 3.81 (1.22) 




Intercepts and Slopes for Feelings Toward Subtypes of Women 
 Women Career 
women 
Feminists Homemakers Party girls 
Intercept M = 83. 30a 
SE = 1.00 
p < .001 
 
M = 81.52b 
SE = 0.99 
p < .001 
 
M = 48.75c 
SE = 1.36 
p < .001 
 
M = 76.63d 
SE = 1.09 
p < .001 
 
M = 47.00c 
SE = 1.49 
p < .001 
 
Slope12 b = 3.59a 
SE = 1.17 





SE = 1.18 
p < .01 
 
b = -2.27b 
SE = 1.33 





SE = 1.18 
p < .001 
 
b = -2.07b 
SE = 1.43 
p = .15 
 
Slope23 b = -2.54a 
SE = 1.48 
p = .09 
b = -1.19a 
SE = 1.48 





SE = 1.70 
p < .01 
b = -1.26a 
SE = 1.50 
p > .40 
 
b = -0.80a 
SE = 1.82 
p > .66 
Note. Bolded values are significant, and marginal p-values are bolded. Values with 
different superscripts within rows significantly differ, p < .05. 
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Table 8 











Slope 12       
Control b = -0.04 
SE = 0.07 
p > .56 
 
b = -0.05 
SE = 0.08 
p > .51 
 
b = -0.18 
SE = 1.77 
p > .91 
 
b = -4.05 
SE = 2.40 
p = .09 
 
b = -6.05 
SE = 2.67 
p < .05 
 
Confront-only b = 0.04 
SE = 0.07 
p > .64 
 
b = -0.10 
SE = 0.07 
p > .15 
 
b = 7.18 
SE = 1.67 
p < .0001 
 
b = -2.03 
SE = 2.26 
p > .36 
 
b = 4.23 
SE = 2.52 
p = .09 
 
Confront+elaboration b = -0.10 
SE = 0.07 
p > .14 
b = -0.13 
SE = 0.07 
p = .07 
 
b = 4.04 
SE = 1.70 
p < .05 
b = -0.78 
SE = 2.31 
p > .73 
 
b = -5.86 
SE = 2.57 
p < .05 
 
Slope 23       
Control b = 0.01 
SE = 0.07 
p > .91 
 
b = -0.06 
SE = 0.07 
p > .40 
 
b = 0.55 
SE = 1.76 
p > .75 
 
b = 3.80 
SE = 2.90 
p > .19 
 
b = -2.13 
SE = 2.76 
p > .44 
 
Confront-only b = -0.05 
SE = 0.07 
p > .48 
 
b = -0.09 
SE = 0.07 
p > .17 
 
b = -3.51 
SE = 1.63 
p < .05 
 
b = 8.22 
SE = 2.71 
p < .01 
 
b = 0.25 
SE = 2.55 
p > .92 
 
Confront+elaboration b = 0.07 
SE = 0.07 
p > .34 
b = -0.003 
SE = 0.07 
p > .96 
b = -2.31 
SE = 1.81 
p > .20 
b = 4.43 
SE = 2.96 
p > .13 
 
b = 1.95 
SE = 2.82 
p > .49 
 
Note: Models for FT women and party girls include the effect of whether participants 
completed Time 3, based on the results of the missingness analyses. 
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Table 9 









FT-      
Party girls 
Intercept  4.27  4.12 79.41 41.15 47.91 
Completion of Time 3 -- --  0 --  0 
Slope12 -0.03  0.08 -1.08* -6.42+ -13.79* 
Slope23  0.004 -0.13+  0.85+  3.92* -1.18 
Condition: control  0  0  0  0  0 
Condition: confront-only  0.11  0.02  4.37  1.55  3.41 
Condition: confront+elaboration -0.04  0.07  3.71 -4.27  1.36 
Participant gender -0.42* -0.46*  -- 13.91* -9.47* 
Slope12*Participant gender -- --  --  --  8.18* 
Slope12*control  0  0  0  0  0 
Slope12*confront-only -0.001 -0.16  9.13*  2.07 12.30* 
Slope12*confront+elaboration -0.08 -0.19  3.95  6.55  3.18 
Slope23*control  0  0  0  0  0 
Slope23*confront-only -0.03  0.03 -4.64+  4.05  1.68 
Slope23*confront+elaboration  0.07  0.12 -3.00  1.08  3.05 
Note. Completion of Time 3 was included as a predictor for feelings toward women and 
party girls, as indicated by missingness analyses, but was not a predictor in these models. 
*p < .05, +p ! .10
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Table 10 









FT-      
Party girls 
Intercept  4.27  4.21 76.92 39.76 60.96 
Completion of Time 3 -- --  3.25* -- 0 
Slope12 -0.03  0.08 -0.18 -6.09 -21.98* 
Slope23  0.004 -0.13  0.55  1.50* -1.18 
Condition: control  0  0  0  0  0 
Condition: confront-only  0.11 -0.03  3.63+  2.20  1.85 
Condition: confront+elaboration -0.04  0.05  2.62 -3.96  0.62 
Need for cognition -- -0.18*  --  2.56 -6.17* 
Participant gender -0.42* -0.47*  -- 14.03* -9.71 
Slope12*Participant gender -- --  --  --  8.18 
Slope12*control  0  0  0  0  0 
Slope12*confront-only -0.001 -0.16  7.36*  1.88 12.36* 
Slope12*confront+elaboration -0.08 -0.20  4.22+  6.48  3.16 
Slope23*control  0  0  0  0  0 
Slope23*confront-only -0.03  0.03 -4.06+  5.34  1.68 
Slope23*confront+elaboration  0.07  0.12 -2.86  1.64  3.05 
Need for cognition*Slope12 -- -- -- -0.64 -- 
Need for cognition*Slope23 -- -- --  4.68* -- 
























Ayers et al. (2009); Foster (1999); Hyers (2007); 
Pratt-Hyatt (2008); Shelton et al. (2006); Swim & 
Hyers (1999)  
Communal 
orientation 




See people as malleable: Rattan & Dweck, (2010)  
Optimism: Sechrist (2010); Wellman, Czopp, & 
Geers (2009) 
Prior experience 
Training/role play: Adams et al., (2003); Aboud & 
Joong (2007); Lamb et al. (2009); Lawson et al. 





Type of sexsim, relationship 
with perp (Ayers et al., 2009) 







Women's gender roles (Hyers, 
2007) 
Negative evluations (Czopp et 
al; Dodd et al, 2001; Kaiser & 
Miller, 2001) 
Personal costs (Shelton & 
Stewart, 2004) Approach-avoidance 














Prepetrators: guilt, discomfort (Czopp & 
Monteith, 2003) 
Anger after hostile confrontation (Czopp et al, 
2006; S1) 
Attitude change 
Perpatrators: more positive 
(Czopp et al.; S3). 
Observer: more positive (Hillard 
& Ryan, 2011) 
Behavior 
change 
Reduced stereotyping (Czopp et al.; 
S1 & 2) and biased language 
(Mallett & Wagner, 2011) 




 Negative: Dodd et al, 
2001; Kaiser & Miller, 
2001; Swim et al., 2009.  
Neutral to positive: Mallett 
& Wagner, 2011; Saunders 
& Senn, 2009. 
Depends on message: Czopp et al, 
2006; Gervais & Hillard, 2011; 
Hyers, 2010; Stone et al, 2011. 
Depends on target status: Gervais 
& Hillard, 2011; Rasinski & 
Czopp, 2010. 
Depends on context:  

















Conflicting results on whether 
target group confronters cause 
more guilt (Czopp & Montieth; 





Calling on norms (Citron et al., 
1950; Marcuse, 1951), ideals 
(Does, Derks, & Ellemers, 2011)  
Hostility 
More guilt and egalitarian 
behavior regardless of hostility, 
but more negative evaluations 
(Czopp et al.; Hyers, 2010) 
Number of 
arguments 
No differnece for short vs. long 







Confrontation more effective for 
low than high prejudice people 







Target: Cowan & Hodge (1996  
Offiensivess: Hillard & Ryan 
(in prep) 
Source: Out- but not in-
group attributed to prejudice 
(Sutton et al., 2007)  
Context and 
audience 
Public/private (Gervais & 
Hillard, 2011). Audience 


















I.  The Context 
 
The following interactions occurred among a group of staff members in the distribution 
department for the local newspaper.  At lunch time the staff members typically get 
together to socialize while they eat their lunches.  The four passages describe interactions 
that occurred during lunch one day.   
 




II.  The Interactions 
 
1. Cindy describes a humorous event from her “wild” weekend.  “I was on my way to 
pick up my boyfriend from the bus station on Friday night in a car I had borrowed from 
one of my friends.  I did not notice that my friend and three others were following me in 
another car.  When my boyfriend and I returned to where I had parked, the car was 
missing.  We both panicked and rushed to the bar across the street to call my friend.  
There the four were sitting, grinning at the prank they had executed, and at the anxiety 








2. After Cindy’s story, the group discussion gave way to a giddy exchange of the staff 
members’ favorite jokes.  Here are a few of those jokes.   
 
 David:   … I have a joke for you. 
   Q:  What did Jeffrey Dahmer say to Lorena Bobbit?   
   A:  “Are you going to eat that?” 
 
 Paula:     …laughter… That’s disgusting!  Okay, I got one.   
   Q:  What did the right breast say to the left breast? 
   A:  If we get any lower, people are gonna think we’re nuts! 
 
 Michael:   … laughter… Okay, have you heard this one? 
   Q:  How can you tell if a blonde’s been using the computer? 
   A:  There’s white-out on the screen! 
 
 Donna: …laughter… all right, here’s another one.   
   Q:  Why did the woman cross the road? 
   A:  Who cares?  What the hell is she doing out of the kitchen? 
 
 Cindy:   … laughter… Okay, here’s one.   
   A man and a woman were stranded in an elevator and they knew 
   they were gonna die.  So, the woman turns to the man and says,  
   “Make  me feel like a woman before I die.”  So he takes off his  











3. Martin describes a time when he and Larry (two intermediate skiers) went skiing.  “We 
take the thunder chair to the top of Vail Peak.  There we find this run called "Devil's 
Revenge" (marked as Expert) and another called "WimpOut" marked as a beginner slope.  
I take a long look down Devil's Revenge.  "That sucker looks straight down.  Let's blow 
this one off" I said.  Larry, as you might imagine, disagrees, "I'm tired of beginner 
slopes.”  He says.  “I'm going to go for it."  I tried to convince him to go down the 
beginner slope.  I tell him that its late in the day, we're both tired.  This is the time of day 
that people make mistakes and get hurt and this run is a killer.  Look 20 yards to the right 
by that broken ski.  What do you see?"  Larry pulls down his goggles and says, "It is just 
some red snow, dude.  Let's live dangerously."  I told him to “go ahead and I'll meet you 












4.  The National Council of Women is an organization committed to serving and 
promoting the political and social advancement of women and women's issues.  It has just 
released "The ABCs of Women's Issues."  The Council is soliciting donations from you 
and your coworkers in the distribution department.   
 
 
Again, imagining yourself in the context of this newspaper group, how much of your own 
money would you be willing to donate to the National Council of Women?  Please 
confine your donations to an amount between $0.00 and $20.00.   
 
















Next year’s funding for RSOs (registered student organizations) at UNL have to be cut by 
20% ($30,000) from the 2009-10 budget of $150,000. The RSOs that will be affect by the 
budget cut are listed on the following page. You will be provided with a description of 
each of those RSOs. 
The Association of Students of the University of Nebraska (ASUN), the student 
governing body, is investigating how the student body believes these funding cuts should 
be allocated among those organizations. ASUN has commissioned researchers on campus 
to aid them in determining how the student population wishes the university to allocate 
the funding cuts. ASUN has given us the form on the next page to be completed by 
participants in our studies. 
Each organization has reported that the 2009-10 budgets were sufficient in funding their 
needs. However, each has expressed serious concerns that a 20% decrease will severely 
curtail their programs and possibly threaten their ability to continue operations. 
Your task is to allocate budget cuts so that across the seven organizations, the overall 
RSO budget is reduced by 20% ($30,000). Allocate the budget cuts to the organizations 
you see fit. We understand that your budget cuts may not add up to exactly $30,000. 
However, please try to match an overall budget cut of $30,000 as closely as you can. 
After you complete your budget cut allocations, you will be asked to give your 
perceptions of how other students might respond. 
Keep in mind that your opinions are important. ASUN will use student allocations to 
make recommendations to the Student Senate, who will represent the student body in the 








ASUN Student Government 
(Association of Students of the University of Nebraska) 
 
Student Organization    2009-10           Your Proposed    Remaining 
      Budget    Funding Cut       Budget 
 
Agricultural Association   $15,500  _____________________  _____________________ 
Jewish Cultural Collective   $23,500  _____________________  _____________________ 
Safe Arrival for Everyone (SAFE)  $22,200  _____________________  _____________________ 
National Student Council of Women  $24,050  _____________________  _____________________ 
Study Abroad Learning Program  $26,200  _____________________  _____________________ 
Nebraska Black Student Union (NBSU) $24,050  _____________________  _____________________ 
Cinema Club     $14,500  _____________________  _____________________ 
 
Do you belong to any of these student organizations?  
  YES  NO 
If yes, which ones do you belong to? 
 
